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Energy and maritime-history affairs have played particularly important parts in the 
alignment of regional and international relations in the Eastern Mediterranean, and 
Turkey has played a pivotal regional role in all these matters. This study examines the 
role of Turkey as it explores the Middle East more generally, from World War II to the 
present day, asking how dynamic strategic alliances and regional relations in the Eastern 
Mediterranean have been regulated in terms of energy and maritime-security issues. The 
thesis has five chapters:  
Chapter II discusses the geographic, political, military, and especially economic 
importance of the region.  
Chapter III provides a historical review of energy and maritime-related crises and 
case studies that occurred in the Eastern Mediterranean and their effect on the alignments 
of strategic alliances. 
Chapter IV presents the current situation in the Eastern Mediterranean in terms of 
energy and maritime security and examines Turkey`s increasing strategic role in the 
region. This chapter provides information about the importance of Eastern Mediterranean 
hydrocarbon resources, the geopolitical importance of Turkey as an energy hub, probable 
energy problems in default of delimitation of the maritime area, strategic-alliance 
problems and the militarization of energy security. 
Chapter V summarizes the main analyses and presents the importance of the 
current geostrategic alignment of alliances in terms of energy and maritime security, and 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
A long history of energy and maritime-security related events in the Eastern 
Mediterranean have demonstrated that the region will remain an important arena for 
determining strategic relations and cooperation in world politics. Energy and maritime-
history affairs have played particularly important parts in the alignment of regional and 
international relations in the region. Turkey has played a pivotal regional role in all these 
matters. This study examines the role of Turkey as it explores the Middle East more 
generally, from World War II to the present day, asking how dynamic strategic alliances 
and regional relations in the Eastern Mediterranean have been regulated in terms of 
energy and maritime-security issues. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
The Eastern Mediterranean region, which today attracts international interest in 
hydrocarbon exploration and production, has been one of the world`s most strategic 
regions. Major historical events as the Cold War, the Arab–Israeli Conflict (related to the 
Suez Crisis of 1956 and energy crisis of 1973, for example), Turkey’s Cyprus Peace 
Operation of 1974, Israel’s blockade of Gaza, and the Arab Spring, contributed to the 
alignment of regional and global alliances. As a result of such events, the region has 
witnessed great power rivalries and significant crises that have had broader application in 
our understanding of the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean, historically and 
currently. 
Historically, the Eastern Mediterranean, in which early maritime trade began, was 
at the center of many great conflicts and important events because of its geostrategic 
location between civilizations. Since the region lies at the axis of movement, both north–
south and east–west, it has been at the juncture of the land and maritime trade, energy 
transportation, and naturally, great conflicts and crises. Many groups have tried to 
conquer Cyprus, for example, in order to control maritime trade and security. Another 
example is the Suez Canal, one of the most strategic gateways between Europe, Asia and 
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Africa. Moreover, some of the holiest places of major religions are located in the region. 
All of these contributed to the mobilization of civilizations in this area.  
In the 19th century, maritime trade in the Eastern Mediterranean gained even 
more strategic importance after the opening of the Suez Canal, the shortest link between 
the east and the west. The transportation of trade goods and energy resources among 
Asia, the Middle East, and Europe increased dramatically after the opening of the canal. 
By 1955, approximately two-thirds of Europe’s oil passed through the canal.1 Another 
more recently developed strategic aspect of the Eastern Mediterranean is pipelines. For 
example, The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, a long crude-oil pipeline from the 
Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, is one of the most strategic energy routes from the 
Southern Caucasus to Europe.2 These maritime and energy-related issues have played an 
important role in international relations.  
Historical events demonstrate that energy and maritime-related crises and 
conflicts in the region have had an important effect on the alignment of the alliances in 
the region. After World War II, many events such as Arab–Israeli conflict, United 
Kingdom’s role in Cyprus and Turkey’s Peace Operation, the Cold War, and the Arab 
Spring have led to the realignment of alliances in the region. For example, during the 
Arab-Israel Conflict, oil-producing Arab members of OPEC, along iwth Egypt, Syria and 
Tunisia, proclaimed an oil embargo in response to the U.S. decision to resupply the 
Israeli military during the Yom Kippur war in 1973.3 As a result, a global energy crisis 
occurred. Another example of the realignment of alliances was the Cyprus dispute. 
Cyprus has been at the heart of the strategic defense of the great powers’ Middle Eastern 
concerns. Energy and maritime security were the most important among these concerns. 
Troubled by ethnic problems, Cyprus was an important alliance factor among the powers 
in the region, which affected the aligning of alliances. The Cyprus conflict was not only 
an intergroup conflict, but an international conflict. Similarly, after the discovery of huge 
                                                 
1 Alan B. Mountjoy,The Suez Canal, Geography, Vol. 42, No. 3 (July 1957), pp. 186 
2 Graham E. Fuller, The New Turkish Republic (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace 
Press, 2008), 86 
3 Bernard Reich, The Powers in the Middle East, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987), 8 
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reserves, an oil and gas bonanza in the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus is attracting 
international interest in hydrocarbon transportation, exploration, and production. A 
probable realignment of alliance in the region is on the horizon. After relations between 
Israel and Turkey shifted because of Israel’s blockade of Gaza, which resulted in the 
Flotilla Crisis (2010), Israel sought alternative allies in the Mediterranean region, 
courting Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) to 
cooperate in strategic issues such as energy exploration and transportation, even though 
Greece and GCASC have long been known as supporters of the Palestinians in the 
historical Israeli–Palestinian conflict.4   
Turkey is itself a major “energy-bridge” for oil and gas transportation from the 
Middle East and Caspian Sea area to the lucrative markets of Europe. This brings to mind 
another problematic issue: the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) proclamation and 
delimitation of maritime areas in the region. For instance, Israel is also currently engaged 
in drilling for gas in the Tamar field within the EEZ, agreed upon with GCASC.5 
Reciprocal agreements between states on EEZ issues cause important international 
problems regarding the energy and maritime security of each state. Thus, conflict among 
regional states in the Eastern Mediterranean could reemerge as a global source of 
instability as a result of conflicts over energy supply, and, as Moran and Russell argue, 
“energy resources may become casus belli in themselves, or they may be viewed as 
alternatives to the use of force by governments, who persuade themselves that wielding 
the energy weapon will somehow obviate or substitute for the use of real ones.”6 
 The Eastern Mediterranean has been an important strategic region regarding 
energy and maritime-related occurrences. As events since World War II illustrate the 
region will remain an important determiner of strategic relations and cooperation of states 
                                                 
4 Alexander Murinso, Strategic Realignment and Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean, BESA 
Center Perspectives Paper No. 159, January 9, 2012, p:1 
5 Alexander Murinso, Strategic Realignment and Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean, BESA 
Center Perspectives Paper No. 159, January 9, 2012, p:3 
6 James A. Russell and Daniel Moran, eds., Energy Security and Global Politics: The 
Militarization of Resource Management (Routledge Global Security Studies: Taylor & Francis, 2008). 
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in world politics. Turkey, as a rising international player and influential regional power, 
is likely to play an important role in shaping the future of the Eastern Mediterranean. 
C. PROBLEMS, HYPOTHESIS AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis considers several questions concerning the Eastern Mediterranean: (1) 
why do we see the realignment of so many strategic alliances in the post-World War II 
era (2) are the energy and maritime-security-related events in the region so important for 
these dynamic alignments, (3) is Turkey an influential arbiter that can act in current and 
future regional and international alignments in the region?  
The strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean begins with the three 
monotheistic religions, each spreading their influence globally, that have had their origins 
there. Moreover, the region is strewn with battle fields that chronicle the rise and fall of 
empires built upon the wealth of trade between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean.7 
Bernard Reich emphasizes the cultural aspect of Western interests in the region noting 
that the Judeo-Christian heritage of Western civilization provides a link between the U.S., 
Western Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean.8  This link has an enormous effect on 
most corners of today’s world. He illustrates how World War II also played a major role 
in shaping concerns in the Eastern Mediterranean. That is, oil became a political, and 
then military concern, thus making the strategic value of the area more obvious for the 
U.S. and then the Soviet Union. Moreover, Reich argues that Israel’s independence and 
the Arab-Israel War, which were instruments of U.S. involvement, made the Eastern 
Mediterranean one of the most strategic arenas of the world.9 
World War II changed the great-power game in the Middle East. Bruce Kuniholm 
analyzes the situation from the perspective of the British Empire’s buffer zones such as 
Iraq, Syria, Iran or Cyprus. 10 Although Britain had controlled the buffer states in the 
                                                 
7 Bernard Reich, The Powers in the Middle East, (Newyork: Praeger Publishers, 1987).3 
8 Ibid., 61. 
9 Reich, The Powers in the Middle East, (Newyork: Praeger Publishers, 1987),57 
10 Bruce Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press,1994). 4.  
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region, World War II changed the nature of great-power influence resulting the British 
decline with the British turning to the United States to protect her line of communications 
in the Eastern Mediterranean. This led to the rise of the Soviet-American rivalry.11 
According to Reich, the 1967 War was a turning point for the U.S. influence in the region 
and her arms supply policy. The U.S. sought to ensure a military balance and provided 
Israel with the equipment essential to balance Soviet arms supplies to the Arab states, 
Egypt and Syria.12 He mentions two energy crises (1967 and 1973) and their effects on 
the global economy as examples of religions’ strategic influence. According to Reich, 
OPEC’s oil as a foreign policy instrument, in 1967 after the outbreak of hostilities among 
Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Israel, aimed to force the Western governments to end their 
support for Israel.13 This created minor dislocations in the market and had a temporary 
adverse effect on international currencies because most important members of OPEC did 
not act in unity. On the other hand, the second attempt of Arab members of OPEC in 
1973 was more successful according to Reich, because major oil companies negotiated a 
new set of pricing agreements.14 It is obvious that energy related crisis in the region had 
severe global effects and changed the alignments in the region. 
For understanding the strategic importance of the Mediterranean Sea, the author 
Frank Gervasi analyzes great-power confrontations and the changing nature of 
international relations in the Eastern Mediterranean during the Cold War era. He 
criticizes these dynamic alignments of alliances depending on the Soviet-American 
rivalry and their plans for controlling the natural resources of the region.15 He argues 
that, these confrontations achieved little beyond a criminal waste of people’s lives.16  He 
presents the Soviet interests in the Mediterranean as 1) a sphere of secure political 
influence, 2) locations for naval and air bases, 3) firm military alliances with countries of 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 5. 
12 Ibid., 71. 
13 Ibid., 8. 
14 Ibid., 9. 
15 Frank Gervasi, Thunder Over the Mediterranean, (Newyork: Mckay Publication, 1975), 4 
16 Ibid. 
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the area, 4) favorable trade terms and 5) access to Middle Eastern oil.17 To support his 
argument, he gives an example of the changing character of USSR relations with Turkey 
comparing the relations between the 1950s and 1960s. He mentions that, in the 1960s, the 
Soviet Union abandoned hostile confrontation with neighbors in favor of large scale 
economic cooperation, credits and technical aid. One significant consequence of the 
Russian rapprochement with Turkey and several Arab states was the growing presence of 
the Soviet fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean.18 He criticizes the consequences of those 
power confrontations in the region such as global energy crisis of 1970s, calling these 
“energy weapon” operations “Operation Blackmail”19. He argues that, alliances in the 
Eastern Mediterranean have been economic rather than political. He illustrates this with 
the example of Egypt during the Cold War. He emphasizes Soviet effects on Egyptian 
politics and mentions Egypt’s ironic overtures to the Western world. He suggests that, 
during the liberalization period of the Sadat regime in Egypt, ambitious plans were 
announced for reopening and widening the Suez Canal.20  There were plans for building 
a new Suez–Cairo–Alexandria oil pipeline with western money and American 
engineering.21 This exemplifies the Sadat’s strategy to exchange Washington for 
Moscow and realign relationships according to strategic concerns.   
Energy resources and the strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean as a 
maritime junction have had important influences on the regions’ states. Regarding those 
historical events, Turkey, located in the junction of energy resources, has always been a 
key player and an important buffer state in great power confrontations. As Russell and 
Moran argue, “control of energy resources, or the rights of buyers and sellers in the 
energy marketplace, may become explicit objects or tools of strategic coercion, either by 
governments or by others who may be able to seize control of them.” 22 Graham Fuller 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 331. 
18 Frank Gervasi, Thunder Over the Mediterranean, (Newyork: Mckay Publication, 1975), 330 
19 Ibid., 409. 
20 Ibid., 436. 
21 Ibid. 
22 James A. Russell and Daniel Moran, eds., Energy Security and Global Politics: The 
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argues that Turkey has been affected by this ‘energy weapon’ both as consumer and as an 
East-West transit node for regional energy flows.23 Fuller notes the strategic relations 
between Turkey and regional resource-rich countries such as Iran. He mentions that 
Turkey is now becoming a major hub for the consumption of Iranian gas and oil, as well 
as for its transport to the West despite the strong opposition of the U.S.24  Additionally, 
Turkey`s relations with Caucasian countries as a bridge for their energy resources 
transported to the West via BTC oil pipeline ending in the Eastern Mediterranean, seems 
an independent strategic act not similar to the Cold War policies of Turkey as a buffer 
state. Fuller also suggests that Russia now views Turkey as an independent competitor to 
Moscow and no longer an instrument of the U.S. policies.25  
Regarding the current situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, according to 
Alexander Murinson, recent discoveries of substantial natural gas fields in the Eastern 
Mediterranean challenge Turkey’s claim as the central energy hub for Europe and create 
problems regarding the delimitation of maritime zones in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Murinson argues that Turkey is threatening to deter and harass Cypriot, Israeli and Greek 
alliances on natural gas exploration efforts in the Eastern Mediterranean.26 He presents 
bilateral relations of Israel, GCASC and Greece regarding energy issues and problematic 
EEZ agreements. He mentions that in recent years, Israel and GCASC have increasingly 
sought independent sources of energy on their Mediterranean marine shelves. He argues 
that the clarification of the borderline is essential in protecting Israel’s rights to oil and 
underwater gas reservoirs. He criticizes Turkish naval activities and naval demonstrations 
near the Israeli gas installations in the alleged EEZ of Israel and GCASC27, and 
concludes that Israel, GCASC and Greece should pursue a diplomatic campaign to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Militarization of Resource Management (Routledge Global Security Studies: Taylor & Francis, 2008), 
3. 
23 Graham E. Fuller, The New Turkish Republic (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace 
Press, 2008), 84. 
24 Ibid., 112. 
25 Ibid., 113. 
26 Alexander Murinso, Strategic Realignment and Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean, 
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 159, (January 9, 2012), 1.    
27 Ibid., 4. 
 8 
maintain their hold on their EEZs on par with other countries. Moreover, he asserts that 
they should increase naval presence in their alleged EEZs in order to protect their access 
to resources.28 
On the other hand, Cihat Yayci argues that Turkey should effectively advocate for 
and safeguard its legitimate rights and interests in the Eastern Mediterranean in terms of 
international law and bilateral agreements.29 He mentions that Turkey has the longest 
coastline in the region and has the right to claim the EEZ by making treaties on the 
delimitation of maritime zones with Egypt, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
(TRNC), Syria, Libya, Israel and Lebanon with which they share coasts facing one 
another.30 He concludes that through such treaties Turkey and other actors in the region 
will be able to assert a new map of maritime areas in Eastern Mediterranean in 
accordance with its own rights and interests enshrined in international law.31 Similarly, 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (TMFA) argues that this provocative policy 
compromises and prejudges the Turkish Cypriots’ (TCs) existing equal rights over the 
natural resources of the island and the sea areas of the Island of Cyprus.32  Besides, 
Turkey suggests that this issue should be a part of the comprehensive settlement in 
Cyprus, and Turkish and Greek Cypriots (GCs) should benefit equally from the Island’s 
natural resources. The GCs unilateral actions do not only disregard TCs existing rights 
but also challenge Turkey’s maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean in the west 
of the Island. Finally, TMFA mentions that Turkey will not allow under any 
circumstances foreign oil companies to conduct unauthorized hydrocarbon exploration in 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 5. 
29 Cihat Yayci, The Problem of Delimitation of Maritime Areas in Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey, 
Bilgesam Journal, Bilge Strateji, (No: 6, Spring 2012), 1.   
30 Cihat Yayci, The Problem of Delimitation of Maritime Areas in Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey, 
Bilgesam Journal, Bilge Strateji, (No: 6, Spring 2012), 2. 
31 Ibid., 57. 
32 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Greek Cypriot's Unilateral Activities in the Eastern 
Mediterranean," http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa (accessed 
November/12, 2012).   
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the disputed areas of the Eastern Mediterranean, and will protect its legal rights and 
interests in these maritime areas.33 
At first glance it may seem that EEZ problems and delimitation of maritime zones 
for energy issues in the Eastern Mediterranean are independent from great power politics. 
However, the energy companies of great powers, such as Russia’s Gazprom and the 
U.S.’s Noble Energy are important participants of this energy game. Besides, this region 
is a an important alternative to Russia in providing Europe`s energy needs. Indirectly, the 
U.S., Russia and Europe are key players of this energy game on this historic battlefield, 
the Eastern Mediterranean. Energy concerns raise a new set of questions: Is a new Cold 
War era, concerning the militarization of energy, starting in the Eastern Mediterranean? 
Is Turkey an independent player in this new era, or again a buffer state between great 
powers? How does the role of economics in the region compared with the influence of 
politics, religion, or culture on strategic relations?  And finally, is Turkey paying as much 
attention to this region today as other states do? 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Examining events related to energy and maritime security in the Eastern 
Mediterranean since World War II, this thesis intends to accomplish three major goals: 
(1) to give historical information about three major events that occurred in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, (2) to asses and analyze these energy and maritime security-related events 
in terms of the realignment of alliances, (3) to analyze the current situation in the Eastern 
Mediterranean in light of historical events, and asses Turkey’s emerging role regarding 
regional energy and maritime-security-related issues. 
First, this thesis attempts to give historical information energy security related 
events: the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the Oil Crisis, Cyprus 
Dispute. These crisis and their consequences are used as case studies to assess the current 
situation in the Eastern Mediterranean 
                                                 
33 Cagatay Erciyes, "Maritime Delimitation and Off-Shore Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean: 
Legal and Political Perspectives, Recent Developments," Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/site_media/html/maritime_delimitation.pdf (accessed November/03, 2012).   
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Second, the thesis seeks answers to the question how seemingly local crisis in the 
Eastern Mediterranean have resulted in a great power game and new state alignments.  
Finally, to analyze the current situation and probable strategic alignment in the 
region, the thesis examines certain maritime and energy-related disputes in the region in 
light of case studies and Turkey’s emerging role as a potential power in the region. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis has five chapters: (1) Introduction, (2) Strategic Importance of the 
Eastern Mediterranean, (3) Historical Review of Certain Events as Case Studies (4) 
Current Energy and Maritime Security Situation in the eastern Mediterranean and 
Turkey`s Role, (5) Conclusion.  
Chapter II discusses the geographic, political, military, and especially economic 
importance of the region. It analyzes the struggles to control the world’s most important 
junction point of maritime trade and natural resources and civilizations.  
Chapter III provides a historical review of the energy and maritime-related crises, 
and case studies that occurred in the Eastern Mediterranean and their effect on the 
alignments of strategic alliances. Those events are the Arab-Israeli Conflict (related Suez 
Crisis and 1973 Energy Crisis) during the Cold War’s great-power confrontations, and 
the struggle for Cyprus.   
Chapter IV presents the current situation in the Eastern Mediterranean in terms of 
energy and maritime security, and examines Turkey`s increasing strategic role in the 
region. This chapter provides information about the importance of Eastern Mediterranean 
hydrocarbon resources, the geopolitical importance of Turkey as an energy hub, probable 
energy problems in default of the delimitation of maritime areas, strategic-alliance 
problems and the militarization of energy security. 
Chapter V summarizes the main analyses and presents the importance of the 
current geostrategic alignment of alliances in terms energy and maritime security, and 
Turkey’s key role in the settlement of disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean.  
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II.  IMPORTANCE OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN  
A. HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE 
The Eastern Mediterranean Region, which today attracts international interest in 
hydrocarbon exploration and production, has been arguably one of the world’s most 
strategic regions. Since the region lies at the axis of movement, both north-south and 
east-west, it has been at the juncture of the land and maritime trade, energy transportation 
and, naturally, great conflicts and crises due to its geostrategic importance. 
Since ancient times, the Eastern Mediterranean has played a significant role in 
cultural, commercial, and military history.34 Culturally, the southeastern crescent of the 
Mediterranean has been an important schoolroom of most of the human race. This region 
was the birthplace of two important monotheistic religions, Judaism and Christianity, and 
is a significant holy land for another monotheistic religion, Islam. Jerusalem, for instance, 
is perhaps the only city in the world that is considered historically and spiritually 
significant to Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike. For Jews, the land was thought holy 
even before they occupied it, because they believe that God had promised the land to 
them. For Christians, Jerusalem is holy because the passion and resurrection of Jesus took 
place on this land. Visiting the Holy Land has been very important for Christians in terms 
of pilgrimage. For Muslims, Jerusalem is Al-Quds “the holy city” because it was the first 
direction of prayer qible, and is the third holy city after Mecca and Medina. 
Commercially, the Eastern Mediterranean has always been an important highway 
for trade between the East and the West, or the Occident and Orient.35 For the Roman 
Empire, the Mediterranean was the heart of the empire and the artery of transportation. 
They named it Mediteraaneo the “middle of the earth” or mare nostrum, “our sea.”36 The 
Roman Empire was the first empire using the Mediterranean’s utility as a strategically 
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indispensable seaway for military operations.37 With the help of the Mediterranean, the 
Roman Empire lasted more than half a millennium. As Roman unity came to an end with 
German and Slav invasions from the north and Muslim conquests from the south, this 
strategic sea faced a series of wars. One of the first was the Crusades, undertaken by 
Western European Christians, with the authorization of the papacy, to take the holy lands 
back from the Muslim world. Although these bloody wars negatively affected the 
stability of the region, the Mediterranean benefitted commercially from the Crusades. 
The Eastern Mediterranean seaports gained their historical importance during the 
Crusades and were revived after the wars.38   
The Crusaders started to retreat after the victories of the Turks. They yielded 
Jerusalem, then Rhodes, Cyprus, and finally, after a long defense, their final stronghold, 
Malta.39 The Ottoman Empire took over the role of the Roman Empire in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. In the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent, who built the walls of 
Jerusalem and battlements that stand to this day, the sea power of the Ottoman Empire 
was unchallenged from Syria to Spain.40 This ancient Latin sea was facing its second 
golden age of being the most important highway of trade and communication. Although 
the Mediterranean retained its importance as a strategic waterway in this period, the 
discovery of the Cape of Good Hope, an alternative route to the East, by Vasco de Gama 
decreased the commercial importance of the Eastern Mediterranean. This route was 
longer than the Mediterranean, but it was much safer and easier. The simultaneous 
decline of Turkish naval power resulted in a power shift in the Mediterranean. From the 
end of the 18th century, after the radical downturn of Ottoman naval power among the 
oceanic world powers, the Napoleonic French started to dominate in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, and the British entered the Mediterranean to maintain the balance of 
power.41  
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Another great power from the north, the Russian Empire, tried to expand its naval 
presence to the Mediterranean. After the historic defeat of a large Ottoman fleet in 
Navarino in 1827, a great power game started in the region. In this battle, for the first 
time, the British and the French navies fought on the same side after the 16th century.42  
After the defeat, the Russian Empire declared war against the Ottoman Empire, and 
Britain and France repaired their relations with the Ottoman Empire and became a virtual 
ally with the Ottomans in order to prevent the Russians from reaching the 
Mediterranean.43 This power game intensified after the French cut a canal across the 
Suez in 1869, a shortcut between the Orient and Occident, and revived the historical 
importance of the Eastern Mediterranean.44 After the opening of the Suez Canal, the 
strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean was greater than it had ever been.  
After the opening of the Suez Canal and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire’s 
power in the Mediterranean, the British Empire upon which “the sun never set,” 
controlled  strategic points such as Gibraltar, Cyprus, and the Suez Canal. The main 
reasons for British expansion were the radical growth of trade and finance, military 
finance, and technical developments in warfare.45  This era was revolutionary for the 
British Empire in more ways than one. Britain had made itself a center of redistribution 
of goods, arriving not only from its colonies, but from many parts of the world. 
Controlling the strategic points in the Eastern Mediterranean allowed the British to 
control the region and its colonies, both in the east and west.  
The American presence in the Eastern Mediterranean dates back to the 18th 
century. After American independence, the Royal Navy was no longer responsible for the 
protection of American merchant ships in the Mediterranean and Levant. The young 
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American republic tried to create alliances with other powers, such as France, Algerian 
deys, or Barbari pirates.46  
However, France refused to provide naval protection against the pirates, and 
offered instead to negotiate with the Barbary states on behalf of the United States. These 
negotiations with the regional pashas would cost to this young nation nearly $1 million, 
which was impossible to for the U.S. to pay, as its national budget was lower than $6 
million.47 This triggered the creation of a transoceanic naval force. Thomas Jefferson 
proposed to the European powers the formation of a kind of “League of Maritime 
Nations” for creating a joint military force against piracy in the Mediterranean.48 
However, the European powers, distrusting and fighting each other, did not cooperate 
with this young and weak nation. Thomas Jefferson decided to use the U.S. Navy to 
defeat the Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean. After naval attacks against the pirates 
and deterrence strategies against the local deys of the Barbary coast, the centuries of 
piracy in the Mediterranean came to an end, resulting in the birth of a strong United 
States Navy.49   
During the 19th century, British dominance in the region continued. However, at 
the beginning of the 20th century, with rising nationalism inspired by the Western 
principles of self-determination and anti-imperialism, the British hegemony in the 
Eastern Mediterranean started to fade. This only intensified after the World War II.50 In 
the post–World War II period, the aim of U.S. foreign policy in the region was to prevent 
the spread of Soviet influence, protect Middle East oil and help create and maintain a 
Jewish state in Palestinian territories.51 The U.S. and the Soviet Union were pitted 
against one another around the world, and no less so in the Eastern Mediterranean.   
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Russia wanted to control the Turkish Straits and Suez Canal in order to benefit 
from the strategic importance of the region, to control oil resources, and to achieve its 
historic goals, such as obtaining free access to the Mediterranean and controlling the 
resources in the Middle East.52 Having played a critical role in world history for 
centuries, the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean continued in the modern era, 
reflected in the continued struggle for domination over its dominion. 
As Frank Gervasi argues, “one of history’s most important lessons is that whoever 
controlled the Mediterranean dominated Europe, Africa, Asia, and controlled half the 
Atlantic and wielded great power in the Pacific.”53   
B. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE 
The Eastern Mediterranean joins the Indian Ocean with the Mediterranean and the 
Atlantic Ocean. It also joins much of the Middle East with the West; the Suez Canal is 
the shortest way between the East and West. It is also an important international 
navigation canal linking the Mediterranean Sea at Port Said and the Red Sea at Suez. For 
international maritime trade, the canal is vital in terms of saving distance, cost, and time. 
After the opening of the Suez Canal by the French and Egyptian governments, it was 
operated by an Egyptian company. In only a few years, the canal proved important by 
providing the shortest link between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Moreover, 
the canal enabled Western colonial powers to control and govern their colonies.  
The Island of Cyprus has also remained an important geostrategic location in the 
Mediterranean for centuries. The island kept its strategic importance under the control of 
the Venetian maritime empire, the Ottoman Empire, Napoleonic France, the British 
Empire, and the U.S and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Today, shipping routes 
for oil and competition for the control of potential chokepoints make international actors 
very involved with that island country. 54 Cyprus is located on the sea lane of the great 
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maritime highway that connects the Mediterranean Sea through two sea gates, the Suez 
and Bab al-Mandab, with the Indian Ocean. 
Politically and militarily, the Eastern Mediterranean is the eastern border of the 
world’s most powerful military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO. 
The region has also become the border of the European Union after the membership of 
the Greek Cypriot administration of Southern Cyprus. During the Cold War, NATO 
focused on enlargement in Eastern Europe, and the Mediterranean received secondary 
attention as regards security issues.55 During the Cold War, the main focus of NATO in 
the Mediterranean had been to limit Soviet influence in the area.56 It is obvious that the 
Soviet Union sought to strengthen political relations with Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and 
Libya in that period. Despite these threats, the Eastern Mediterranean was never as 
important as the Central Front, which was concentrated in central Europe to counter an 
anticipated Warsaw Pact assault.57 With the end of the Cold War, the center of risks and 
challenges moved to the southern and eastern Mediterranean.58 In this era, NATO 
became freer to operate out of this new Central Front, and security issues concerning the 
Middle East and Gulf began to have  increasing impact on the security and stability of the 
region in particular and the global economy in general.59 Thus, new approaches to 
security and cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean are likely to become an important 
part of reform and adaptation within the alliance.60 For both NATO and the EU, energy 
issues have appeared as a security concern, and with the growth of new lines of 
communication for energy in the Eastern Mediterranean basin, the interests of these two 
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giant political and military organizations regarding energy security are now more broadly 
shared.61  
As a result of the increasing importance of the region, NATO’s Mediterranean 
Dialogue was initiated in 1994 by the North Atlantic Council. With the help of this 
initiative, NATO has relations with seven non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean 
region: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.62 This dialogue 
reflects the alliance’s view that security in Europe is closely linked to security and 
stability in the Mediterranean.  
 
Figure 1.  NATO Members, Invited Countries around the Mediterranean and 
Mediterranean Dialogue Countries.63 
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For the European Union (EU), the 2004 expansion (its fifth), in which the EU 
grew from 15 to 25 member state, was the largest in its history.64 Even though Cyprus 
Island was divided and the 2004 UN referendum for the reunification of the island was 
rejected by the GCs, the EU paradoxically accepted the membership of the island as 
United Cyprus Republic, claiming that the TRNC is void, and confirming that the Greek 
part of the Island represents the entire island65 Thus, the borders of the EU extended to 
the Eastern Mediterranean, with the problematic membership of the GCASC, which the 
EU recognizes as the Cyprus Republic.  
  
 
Figure 2.   Borders of the EU after the membership of GCASC (The EU recognizes as 
Cyprus). 66 
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After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Eastern Mediterranean  appeared as 
the alternative route for transportation of  Central Asian energy and commercial items to 
Europe. As Cyprus is located at the center of this alternative energy and maritime route, 
membership of the island was vital for the future of the EU. The island is also vital for 
the new global and regional security strategy of the EU.  
The EU, primarily an economic bloc, opened its doors to many countries once in 
the Soviet orbit. NATO, a military alliance, accepted the Czech Republic, Poland, and 
Hungary as members.67 The boundaries of the West moved east and south. Thus, the 
Eastern Mediterranean became the outer limit of the West.  
Most analysts believe that the EU, such as NATO, needs to be revised, and that 
today’s period of urgent crisis requires a revised security strategy.68 The new European 
Security Strategy (ESS) argues that in the 21st century, the EU should have a new security 
strategy that should fulfill three functions: it should have political appeal and thus 
potential to inspire, it should serve as a guideline for daily bureaucratic work, and it 
should serve as a way of communicating the EU and its views to a broad audience, within 
the EU as well as outside.69 Thus, a new strategy concerning timing, institutional flux, 
new threats, and shifting geopolitics is seen vital.70 The Eastern Mediterranean, which is 
at the axis of shifting geopolitics, new threats and institutional flux, has an enormous 
effect on the new ESS. There is widespread agreement that the EU must now show 
leadership and determination at a particularly acute moment of crisis in the region which 
undermines its geopolitical relevance and concerns.71 The threats mentioned in the 2008 
ESS continue to loom. These threats are terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
proliferation, regional conflict, state failure, organized crime, energy security, and 
climate change.72  
                                                 
67 Inbar, E., & Sandler, S., "The Importance of Cyprus," Middle East Quarterly 8(2) (2001), 55.            
68 J. Andersson, "European Security Strategy: Reinvigorate, Revise Or Reinvent?" The Swedish 
Institute of International Affairs no. 7 (2011), 5.         
69 Ibid., 4.     
70 Ibid., 3.   
71 Ibid., 7.   
72 Ibid., 13.   
 20 
Considering the crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean over the past century, the 
revision, reinvigoration, or even reinvention of NATO and the EU are inevitable. J. 
Anderson argues that the situation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) revealed 
a lack of strategic thinking in the EU’s past and showed its weaknesses in preparing for 
quickly changing events.73 He also argues that the recent NATO action in Libya clearly 
shows that the U.S. wants the EU to increase responsibility for its neighborhood.74 It is 
likely that in the near future, these political and military alliances will take greater 
responsibility and initiative in the region, due to its continued importance. 
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III. CASE STUDIES 
A. THE SUEZ CRISIS 
1. Historical Context 
After the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, the European maritime powers 
signed a convention to secure free transit through the Suez Canal, which was opened by 
the French and Egyptian governments in 1869.75 The goal of the British occupation of 
Egypt and maritime agreements was not to conquer the Egyptian land; it was to restore 
political stability in Egypt, which had an important role in its colonial interests. The 
Britain possessed thirty-five colonies, ranging from Nigeria and the Solomons to tiny 
Malta and Ascension.76  Britain did not plan a longstanding occupation; however, nearly 
three-quarters of a century later, as the decade of the 1950s dawned, they were still 
there.77 Till World War II, Britain was the major power in the Middle East, and Egypt 
had vital strategic importance for British interests. As J.C. Hurewitz argues, the Suez 
Canal was “the jugular vein” of the British Empire. Nearly 70 per cent of the total ships 
passing from the canal were British-flagged, and the canal was tying the metropole to 
India, East Africa, and Australia.78 In the interwar years, the British-owned Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) was the leading producer in the world market, producing 
nearly two-thirds of the region’s total. The AIOC also built the world’s largest refinery, 
which fueled the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean. British and French leaders knew that 
the control of navigation was a key strategic issue for their interests in the region. For the 
French, while the distance of the maritime route to India from the Cape of Good Hope 
was 10,400 nautical miles (NM), from the Suez Canal it was only 4,900 NM.79 Britain 
took over the hegemonic control of the canal after the decline of Napoleonic France.  
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The global rise of nationalism and the process of decolonization decreased the 
global power of the British Empire. Once being an empire spanned a quarter of the 
world’s land and a quarter of its people, the British Empire on which the sun never set 
was the victim of two disastrously destructive world wars and the rise of nationalism that 
created independent states.80 In this “realignment of great powers” process, the Suez 
Crisis had a key importance regarding its consequences. The American opposition to 
colonialism caused the dissolution of two colonial powers, France and Britain, and their 
foreign-policy thinking turned away from acting as a great imperial powers.81  
During the first and second quarter of the 20th century, the British Empire was 
controlling strategic energy fields in the region. After the Second World War, the Suez 
Canal regained its status as a strategic waterway, and by 1953 the traffic was 30 per cent 
greater than it was in 1939.82 There were not only oil tankers to and from the Persian 
Gulf, but liners, aircraft carriers, warships, troopships and store ships connected with 
various military campaigns in the Far East.83 The AIOC in the Shatt al-Arab region, the 
Iraq Petroleum Company, an international consortium in the Kirkuk in which British 
companies were entitled to a half-share, and British-owned pipeline terminals at Haifa 
and Tripoli supported the power of the British Empire and its powerful military.84 This 
colonial and imperial character necessitated strategic bases that would enable the empire 
to control its interests. The Suez base was the most appropriate location for these 
purposes. The base lying at the pivot of the Eastern Hemisphere was uniquely located at 
the center of Asia and Africa, and close to south-east Europe.85 It was accessible from 
land, air and sea (the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean). Britain was controlling the 
main institutions of the Egypt, such as the government and economy. The Egyptian 
nationalists were uncomfortable by this control and military presence in their country.  
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Meanwhile the post-war situation, increasing nationalist demands, and the U.S.’s 
increasing concerns in the region lead to a reduction in Britain’s commitment to the 
Zionist cause in Palestine.86 Instead, the U.S. tended to favor Zionism. Similarly, Britain 
wanted the U.S. to take over a protective role in the Middle East. The emergence of 
American interests in the region could be a life buoy for Britain with joint military 
planning and economic support.87 In 1947, Britain formally notified the U.S. Secretary of 
State, George Marshall, that she could no longer carry that burden.88 The Truman 
Doctrine, an American commitment to prevent Soviet expansion, came in as a response 
to Britain’s call.89 
The U.S. was hesitant to deploy military forces in the region because of its 
commitments in Europe and Korea.90 Besides, the U.S. was still worried about the 
colonial character of Britain. After Iran’s nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company in 1951, Britain threatened war over Iran’s behavior.91 Within Egypt, the 
resistance against the Britain increased radically. In 1952, rioters in Cairo burned many 
British-owned buildings and killed some Europeans.92 During this time in Britain, 
Winston Churchill, a conservative wartime leader who was elected in 1951, was in 
power. Churchill was the wartime colleague of Eisenhower and a new hope to some 
people for a return to the historic imperial character of Britain.93 Many believed that, as 
in the old days, Britain and the U.S. could revive the shiny Western empire with their 
special relationship; however, the U.S. did not believe that a dual power in the region 
would dispose of the Soviet threat and bring peace.  
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The anti-colonial character of the U.S., with the help of increasing 
nationalism, accelerated the decolonization process after the World War II.94 British 
Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd expressed this character of the U.S. in his memoirs. 
“ The Americans were, on the face of it, loyal and dependable allies but underneath there 
was in many Americans’ hearts a dislike of colonialism, a resentment of any authority 
left to us from the great days of our empire, and pleased smile, only half concealed, at 
seeing us go down.”95  
The Arab defeat after the first Arab–Israeli War (1948) strained the already bad 
relations between Egypt and Britain. The insult of the defeat intensified the nationalist 
character of the Egyptians. Before the war, the Egyptian government demanded ten days’ 
notice from any power wishing to send a warship through the canal.96 This was a sign of 
evolving Egyptian nationalism against the global powers. During the Arab–Israeli war, 
Egypt inspected and searched the vessels transiting the canal, as the British did during 
World War II.97 Egypt argued that the Suez Canal and Port Said were as Egyptian as 
other parts of the country and should be controlled by Egyptians. After the outbreak of 
the Arab–Israeli war, Egypt started to inspect Israeli-bound cargo ships, despite 
international protests from the UN, France, Britain, and the U.S.98 
Despite the increasing Egyptian opposition to colonialism and willingness to 
evacuate, the British forces in the canal zone exceeded the limits set by the 1936 Anglo–
Egyptian treaty.99 In addition, Iranian opposition to British oil hegemony in their own 
land inspired the Egyptians.   
During this period, many Iranians considered the AIOC exploitative, and its 
nationalization plan constituted a critical element of the Iranian reform program under the 
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Mosaddegh government.100 After the nationalization of AIOC, its British personnel left 
Iran and as a result, operations in the oil fields ceased.101  The nationalization process 
turned out to be an exclusion process that removed Iran from the world oil market. 
Iranian workers were unable to manage professional oil production, and the British-
imposed naval embargo made it impossible for Iran to find tankers to export its oil.102 
The oil-dependent Iranian economy suffered from this self-imposed crisis. Great powers 
such as the U.S. and Soviet Union did not support Iran with its conservationist strategy. 
The U.S. refused to grant financial support and the Soviet Union declined to repay its 
wartime debts to Iran; thus, budget and balance-of-payments deficits increased 
radically.103 Nevertheless, the Egyptians were inspired by the Iranian nationalism and 
continued their willingness to nationalize the Suez Canal and evacuate British forces 
from their lands. 
While Britain was awaiting support from the U.S., the U.S. was developing a 
northern-tier defense system of Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran on the southern border of the 
Soviet Union, called the Baghdad Pact.104 Ray Takeyh argues that in this period, under 
U.S. Cold War objectives, Egyptian pan-Arabism and the British Imperialism were a 
triangular dilemma.105 The U.S. was trying to balance regional interests according to its 
national-security interests. On one hand, the U.S. was trying to alienate the potential pan-
Arabic character of Egypt in order to prevent an Arab-dominated pact near the Israeli 
borders; on the other hand, it was trying to consolidate a northern tier in cooperation with 
the friendly states of Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan to protect the Middle East 
from further Soviet dominance and encircle the Soviets by strategic pro-Western 
alliances.106 It was obvious that American support for Britain in the Middle East was no 
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longer assured, even though they had mutual interests. While the U.S. was in cooperation 
with Britain regarding the Soviet threat and energy issues in the Middle East, Britain was 
forced to sign a new Anglo–Egyptian agreement with Egypt in 1954, requiring British 
troops to leave the country by 1956. 
In this period, Arab–Israeli conflict was worsening and tensions between Egypt 
and Israel were rising. For the first time, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden met 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1955 in Cairo.107 The meeting was sincere and 
friendly. However, four days after the meeting, Britain signed the Baghdad Pact with 
Turkey and Iraq, which jeopardized Nasser’s dream of being the leader of the Arabs. 
Moreover, only eight days after the Eden–Nasser meeting, Israeli armed forces attacked 
the Gaza Strip and killed thirty-eight Egyptians.108 This was a retaliation for Egypt’s 
seizure of Israeli ships because of the Suez blockade and execution of Israeli spies in 
Egypt.  
On the Israeli side, a new coalition government was formed after the 1955 
elections, and Ben Gurion, who resigned in 1954 and served as the minister of defense, 
returned to office as prime minister.109 He continued his old practice of combining 
government issues with the defense portfolio. In this coalition government, the three main 
partners had different opinions about their relation with Egypt. On the one hand, Moshe 
Dayan, an important figure in making national-security policies, wanted a preventive war 
against Egypt; on the other hand, Moshe Sharett, foreign minister, did not want war with 
Egypt.110 While Nasser of Egypt was a strong Arab nationalist and had strong anti-Israeli 
tensions, the majority in the Israel government was of the right-wing Herut Party and 
defenders of war for national security. Thus, the increasing tensions were inevitable. Ben-
Gurion showed a neutral attitude for a war in his first period of office; but in 1956, after 
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the U.S. rejection of Israel’s request for arms, Israel found a new arms supplier, France, 
and the idea of preventive war reemerged.111  
For Egypt’s part, Nasser was not happy with the Baghdad Pact, and the two 
countries, Egypt and Britain, confronted each other again over the Baghdad Pact. The 
reason for Nasser’s denunciation was that he felt the pact was another attempt at 
imperialist domination.112 He also believed that this could prevent his united Arab league 
dream. Because of the increased tensions between Israel, Nasser wanted to strengthen his 
country’s military power, as Israel was trying to do at this time. He tried to get arms from 
the Western powers, however, the U.S., Britain and France were discouraged from 
supplying arms by the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 which required that a balance of 
power in the Middle East would be maintained by those powers.113 As a result of this 
controversial treaty, Nasser got closer to the Soviets and obtained military equipment 
Czechoslovakia. This Tripartite Declaration had problematic effects, because while 
Western powers were trying to limit the Soviet strategic expansion in the region, they 
forced Egypt to find alternative allies. Besides this, France, a participant of the Tripartite 
Declaration, would be a new arms supplier for Israel before and during the crisis. Thus, a 
realignment of alliances process started. 
2. The 1956 Crisis  
Despite his anti-Western policies, President Nasser knew that the economic 
development of Egypt was strongly tied with the West. Thus, he sent his ambassador 
Hussein to the U.S. to announce Egypt’s intention to construct a dam, High Aswan Dam, 
with Western help.114 The U.S. and the U.K. rejected Nasser’s invitation and withdrew 
their offer for constructing the dam. The U.S. and the UK explained their rejection in a 
formal statement mentioning that Egypt had not succeeded in securing the water rights 
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agreements.115 Not only the Western powers, but the Soviet Russia indicated a loss of 
interest in financing the dam.  
Nasser’s diplomatic strive failed and he was alone. This was exactly the desired 
isolation strategy of the West for Nasser. However, they did not expect the next radical 
step that  he took. In July 1956, President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt nationalized the 
Suez Canal, thus taking the strategic trade control from Britain.116 This was a surprise 
action, and the world was shocked against such a step. Thus situation was also 
extraordinary for crisis analyzers. Micheal Shups argues that because the British and the 
Americans were taken by complete surprise when the Egyptians decided to nationalize 
the canal, this conflict constitutes a special type of hypergame.117 A hypergame is a 
situation where one or more of the players has a mistaken interpretation of any aspect of 
the conflict.118 Both the U.S. and Britain had a mistaken interpretation about the next 
step of Nasser. Nasser thought that if he nationalizes the canal, and the English launches 
an attack to take the canal back, this would take more than two months.119 Thus, he 
calculated that an international settlement could be reached within two months to pacify 
the crisis. This move shocked the West, and forced them to take immediate actions for 
the security of the canal. On the other hand, Nasser became a champion of Arab 
nationalism among the Arab states.120  
The canal was legally Egyptian, but in 1869 was granted a 99-year concession, 
and would not revert to Egyptian government till 1968. The 1888 Constantinople 
(Istanbul) Convention, a nine-nation agreement, provided that the canal would be open to 
all shipping both in peace and war.121 President Nasser’s decision to nationalize the Suez 
Canal came after Britain and America’s withdrawal of financial assistance to the Aswan 
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Dam.122  In his speech during the nationalization ceremony, he mentioned that 120,000 
Egyptians had died building the canal, but Egypt was receiving just a very small 
proportion of the company’s £35m annual earnings.123 He emphasized the centuries of 
insult that the Egyptians faced. These hostile decisions triggered British, French, and 
Israeli counter measures against Egypt. According to Eden, Egypt’s seizure of the canal 
left Europe without choice: it had to fight for its place in the world and challenge the 
global order, which was started to be shaped by the U.S. 124  
In October, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched the Sinai Campaign and 
dropped paratroops to the region. Britain and France gave an ultimatum to both Israel and 
Egypt. The ultimatum for Israel was a symbolic one because they were in close relations 
with Israel and had common interests in Suez. However, Britain and France did not want 
an important Israeli advance towards the Suez to protect the canal. On 30 October, before 
the IDF reached the Canal, Britain and France began aerial bombardment of the Egyptian 
forces.125 After days, although Nasser withdrew his forces from the Sinai and Gaza, the 
British and French forces had to stop because of the UN’s and the U.S.’s economic and 
political pressures. Israel was also threatened by the U.S. because of its unwelcomed 
alliance with Britain and France. Israel was told that if it did not withdraw, all official and 
private aid from the U.S. government and American Jewry would be cut off.126  
On November 5, the British and French forces stopped their attack, and on 9 
November, Israeli prime minister announced the withdrawal of IDF.127 There were 
arguably different reasons for these three powers withdrawal. First, UN announced that it 
was ready to take over peacekeeping. Second, the Soviet Union had entered the stage, 
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giving notes to Britain, France and Israel.128 The Soviet note to the Government of the 
United Kingdom read: 
In what position would Britain have found herself if she herself had been 
attacked by more powerful states possessing every kind of modern 
destructive weapon? And there are countries now which need not have 
sent a navy or air force to the coasts of Britain but could have used other 
means, such as rocket technique.129  
Finally, the domestic situations in those countries forced them to stop and 
withdraw. In Britain, the value of the pound was collapsing and the economy was in 
trouble. Saudi Arabia started an oil embargo to Britain and France. This meant that these 
oil-importing economies could face an important threat if the U.S. does not fill the gap. 
However, the U.S. did not fill their energy gap and they were forced to withdraw. 
3. Consequences of the Crisis 
The Suez Crisis had both regional and global consequences. Regarding the energy 
and maritime security, its consequences caused a radical realignment of alliances and a 
shift of power balances. The crisis of 1956 was a turning-point in global history that 
resulted in the emergence of a new international order.130  
For Israel, the crisis seemed to be an historic opportunity for its Zionist expansion 
ideology. Israel had many operational and political objectives during the crisis: to defeat 
the Egyptian army, to overthrow Nasser, to re-open the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships, to 
guarantee and extend the borders, and to create a new political order in the Middle 
East.131 They achieved some of their objectives, such as defeating the Egyptian army, 
re-opening the Straits of Tiran and securing its Egyptian borders. Even though Israel 
could not achieve an expansion, its tactical victory and refusal of early withdrawal from 
Sinai, unlike Britain and France, forced Western powers to take Israel’s security into 
consideration for the settlement in the Middle East.  
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For Britain and France, this period was a radical decline of their historic colonial 
era. Virtually, they, especially Britain, handed over the leadership in the Middle East and 
other regions to the U.S..132 This was in the final removal of the British bases in Egypt 
and the termination of the Anglo-Egyptian agreements. Rather than removing Nasser’s 
influence both in Egypt and in Arab world, the crisis increased his popularity not only in 
the Arab world, but in the third world.133 This popularity would be proved by the strong 
ideology of Arab unity leading to the Egyptian-Syrian union in 1958. Besides, after the 
war, Syria broke diplomatic relations with Britain and France, and the Iraq Petroleum 
Company pipeline, owned by Britain, France and the U.S., crossing Syria was blown 
up.134 On the other hand, the entirely American-owned Trans-Arabian Pipeline 
(TAPline) was untouched. British and French oil supply sources were in danger. They 
were also loosing prestige among Third World countries.  
The crisis was a symbol of a power take over from Britain to the U.S.. British 
colonial existence in the region suffered deeply. The Suez Crisis exposed British inability 
to act without the approval of the U.S..135 This means that alliance was controlled by the 
U.S. Five years later in 1961, Harold Macmillan, prime minister of Britain after Eden, 
made the first (unsuccessful) attempt to join the recently formed European Economic 
Community.136 The decision, like Suez, again divided public opinion, but for the 
political elite (on the left as on the right), the lesson of Suez was that Britain was no 
longer a world power.137 Britain, who had been controlling the whole Middle East two 
decades ago, was reduced to only small tribal states like Abu Dhabi, Aden and 
Kuwait.138 
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For the U.S., the crisis altered the political alignments in the Middle East. The 
Eisenhower doctrine, after the Suez Crisis, constituted a direct American intervention in 
the ensuing Arab Cold War.139 The U.S. not only passivized the British, but also created 
a U.S.-led Arab block against Soviet influence. Since 1953, the U.S. was seeking to 
incorporate the Middle East in its containment alliances network, and after the Suez, the 
U.S. started to achieve its goal in conjunction with the conservative monarchies.140 
In terms of Turkey, during the Cold War, Turkey served as a barrier against the 
expansion of Soviet power into the Mediterranean and Middle East.141 Similarly in Suez 
Crisis, Turkey was doing its historical responsibility of being a buffer state to prevent 
Soviet access to the Mediterranean and the Middle East.142 Before the crisis, the U.S. 
was developing a northern tier defense system of Turkey, Pakistan and Iran on the 
southern border of the Soviet Union, called the Baghdad Pact. Turkey became a buffer 
zone between Soviet Russia and the Mediterranean. This was a mutual-benefit game. 
While the U.S. prevented Russian access to the Mediterranean, NATO membership 
helped Turkey to secure its borders against a Soviet threat. On the other hand, this was 
also a two-edged knife for Turkey, because she was risking its lands to be a sacrifice 
against a Soviet (nuclear) attack to the U.S. as being a satellite state for the U.S. and 
NATO. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 would be a good proof for this two edged 
game. During the missile crisis, Turkish land, such as Cuba, was threatened to become a 
nuclear-confrontation arena of the great powers. 
Beside Turkey’s pro-Western policies in this period, Turkey also wanted to 
strengthen its relations with many Arab countries. Since it was an important regional 
player in the Baghdad Pact and NATO, Turkey signed Friendly Cooperation treaties with 
                                                 
139 Takeyh, Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine, 142.  Ray Takeyh, Origins of the Eisenhower 
Doctrine (New York, NY USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 142. 
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=2004495&ppg=3. 
140 Ibid.Ray Takeyh, Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine (New York, NY USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2000), 143. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=2004495&ppg=3. 
141 F. Stephen Larrabee, Turkey as a U.S. Security Partner (Santa Monica, CA, USA: RAND 
Corporation, 2007), 1. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10227038&ppg=16.           
142 Nicole Johnson, "Turkish Reactions to the Arab Spring: Implications for the United States Foreign 
Policy," Global Security Studies Volume 3, Issue 4 (2012), 2.          
 33 
Iraq and Pakistan. Turkey also wanted to strengthen relations with Egypt; however, Egypt 
wanted to struggle to become a political leader of the Arab nationalism. Similarly, 
Turkey wanted to be the leader of the pro-Western countries in the Middle East. Thus, 
Middle Eastern countries split into two camps: one camp consisted of pro-Western states 
led by Turkey, the other camp of states under the leadership of Egypt seeking to defend 
their political and economic independence against Western exploitation.143  After the 
Suez War, Turkey adopted a balanced but ambiguous position. While considering the 
Anglo-French attack to be a breach of international law, Turkey accused Egypt of having 
responsibility of escalating the conflict.144 Turkey argued that, the Middle Eastern 
countries would have been secured from the Soviet threat if they had joined the Baghdad 
Pact. However, some of the Middle Eastern countries did not perceive Soviet intervention 
as a threat. Another reason for the Arab countries’ opposition to Turkey was that Turkey 
announced that the UN’s 1947 partition plan, which had been rejected by the Arab states, 
could serve as a basis for peace talks.145 In short, Turkish policy during and after the 
Suez Crisis did not have certain borders. On the one hand, while Turkey had severe 
criticism for Israel and recalled its envoy from Israel (which was designed to appease 
public opinion and strengthen the Baghdad Pact), it accepted that relations with the West 
were of paramount importance under all circumstances.    
After the crisis, the interest in European integration grew radically. The formation 
of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom), which were created after the signing of the Rome Treaties in 
March 1957, were the symbols of this European integration process.146 By the late 
1960s, increasing oil dependence to the Middle East had contributed to a growing pro-
Arab strategy by the European governments. Thus, this caused disagreement with the 
U.S. because of its strong commitment to Israel.  
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This crisis was a watershed for shifting take overs among great powers, regional 
powers and other states. It was also the first major international test of non-alignment for 
many states after World War II.147  India, for instance, had cautiously taken care not to 
be involved in the dispute with Britain, France, Israel or the U.S.; and kept other major 
non-aligned nations informed.148  In short, in terms of realignment of alliances, the Suez 
Crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean was a major energy and maritime-security-related 
event after World War II.  
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B. THE 1973 OIL CRISIS 
1. Historical Context 
After the Suez Crisis, despite the existence of the United Nations Emergency 
Force (UNEF) to ensure security between the parties, there were numerous border 
crashes and guerilla attacks from both sides. As a result of these incidents and Israel’s 
threat assessment, Israeli armed forces launched a preemptive attack against Egyptian and 
Syrian forces in 1967. Political alignments after the Suez Crisis were more distinctive 
during this crisis. The Soviet Union supported Egypt, Syria, and Iraq militarily and 
economically in order to gain access to the Arab world;149 Ideologies did not play such a 
great role in shaping strategic relationships.. The security of the Suez Canal was crucial 
for the Russians, as it once had been for Britain, since it became a strategic gate for 
Soviet arms and oil transit to its allies.150 Similarly, China sought to extend its influence 
in the region with the goal of creating an anti-imperialist bloc among those progressive 
Third World Arab countries, such as Syria and Egypt.  
The U.S. backing of Israel increased drastically after the Suez Crisis and in 
seeming contrast, except for pro-Soviet Egypt, Syria and Iraq, the U.S. was also 
continuing to support its Arab allies in the region. President Johnson, personally felt great 
affinity with Israel because of his religious background and saw the Jewish people in 
Israel as “modern day version of the Texans fighting with Mexicans.”151 Similarly, 
during the peace process after the 1967 War, the U.S.’s side was closer to Israel’s. There 
are many examples of America`s tendency to side with Israel during the peace 
negotiations. The United States played a key role in the abortive peace efforts that 
followed the Six Day War, as well as the talks that ended the War of Attrition in 1970.152 
During the peace process, Kissinger was never able to bring much pressure to bear on 
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Israel during his conduct of the “step-by-step” diplomacy that followed the October War. 
Kissinger complained at one point during the negotiations: “I ask Rabin to make 
concessions, and he says he can`t because Israel is weak. So I give him more arms, and 
then he says he doesn`t need to make concessions because Israel is strong.” 153  
Thus, the Middle East became a Cold War battleground and primary area of 
attention for great powers.154  Even though the U.S. was trying to continue strong 
relations with its Arab allies, her strong support of Israel created a public reaction against 
the U.S. among the Arab states. Unlike the Suez Crisis, the U.S. took the Israeli side and 
the USSR took the Arab states’ side during the 1967 War and peace processes after the 
war. Similarly, starting with the 1967 War, superpowers became ever more deeply 
involved in their support of the warring sides, the U.S. supporting Israel, the Soviet 
Union backing the Arabs.155 These alignments also exacerbated the rising Arab 
unification and inter-Arab alliances. Inter-Arab politics thus played an important role 
resulting in an important Arab-Israeli war in 1973. 
2. 1973 War and Consequences 
On Yom Kippur on 06 October 1973, a holy day for the Jewish people, Egypt and 
Syria made a surprise attack from two fronts to Israel. The war moved through several 
stages, from Arab victory at first to total Israeli victory at the end.156 The war officially 
ended on October 22 following a cease fire agreed by all participants. 
During the war, the Nixon administration assumed a quick Israeli victory once 
Israel recovered from the Arab attack. On October 12, Nixon proposed a cease fire to 
both sides, to preserve some Egyptian gains and set the stage for talks.157 Although Israel 
accepted the cease fire, Egypt rejected it since Sadat believed that Egyptian soldiers could 
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regain some more territories. The U.S. wanted to regain the trust and win the confidence 
of the Egyptians, but Sadat, who was supported by Soviet power, rejected this initiative. 
After this, the U.S. decided to release major arms supplies to Israel.158  On the other 
hand, the Soviets tried to prevent Egyptian loses against Israelis. Sadat was determined to 
regain Sinai with Soviet support.  
The War of 1973 was a surprise attack from Israeli analysts’ point of view. They 
were aware of Syrian and Egyptian war plans. However, they did not think the Arabs 
were serious about going to war. Great-power alignments during this war, encouraged the 
Arabs to carry out a preemptive attack against Israel. Similarly, after the attack, the 
U.S.’s airlifted tons of weapons allowed Israel to re-attack and not withdraw easily from 
the lands it occupied. The Soviets placed seven airborne divisions on alert, and an airlift 
was organized to transport them to the region, and they deployed many amphibious 
warfare crafts in the Mediterranean to help the Arabs.159  The U.S. continued to supply 
Israel with military equipment. The super power rivalry was   intensified the conflict.160  
During the pre-war period, some Arab regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia, 
remained closer to the U.S. seeking their protection against the Communist threat. They 
agreed with Kissinger that the Soviets should be excluded from the region, 161  but after 
the U.S.’s clear support to Israel during the war, many Arab countries, such as Saudi 
Arabia, decided that the U.S.’s main goal was not to bring an end to the historic Arab-
Israeli conflict. Thus, the Saudis started to threaten to cut back their oil production, which 
could seriously affect the global economy in general but American energy concerns in 
particular.162 With the super powers’ intervention in the crisis, a local Eastern 
Mediterranean problem would turn into a global crisis. 
                                                 
158 Ibid.    
159 Ian J. Bickerton, Arab-Israeli Conflict : A History (London, GBR: Reaktion Books, 2009), 135. 
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10430645&ppg=4.                                                                      
160 Khalidi, Sowing Crisis : The Cold War and American Hegemony in the Middle East , 83. 
161 Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 317.                                                                 
162 Ibid.  
 38 
The U.S. wanted to repair the broken relations with Egypt to exclude the Soviet 
intervention in post-war peace agreements. Kissinger worked on military disengagement 
and resolution of territorial problems over a two-year period with a series  of meetings 
with both Arab and Israeli leaders.163  Kissinger’s satellite diplomacy convinced Sadat 
that the U.S. was a key country for settlement of the conflict, and turning to Americans, 
rather than Soviet Union, was vital for Egypt’s future. The 1978 Peace Treaty between 
Israel and Egypt, which was mediated by Jimmy Carter and, provided the return of Sinai 
to Egypt, would be an indicator of a new, cemented U.S.-Egypt alliance.164 
Although Israel was the victor in the final stage, the impressive performance of 
the Arab armies in the initial phase of the war restored Arab pride, honor and self-
confidence after the defeat of 1967.165 After the war, the foundations of peace 
agreements were laid because of this performance of Arabs against the U.S. backed 
Israel. While the U.S. had supported Israel, after it understood the Arab insistency and the 
prospective change in Arab political alignment it quickly tried to restore the relations 
with Arab countries. However, these diplomatic and seemingly controversial maneuvers 
could not convince many oil producing Arab countries 
3. Oil Crisis 
In 17 October 1973, the Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries, plus Egypt, Tunisia and Syria, announced an embargo on oil 
exports to selected countries that supported Israel during the war.166 This embargo 
resulted in a dramatic increase in oil prices, radical changes in the strategies of oil 
dependent countries and stagflation of some economies. Many Western European 
countries and Japan quickly changed their alignment from pro-Israeli to pro-Arab. In a 
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U.S. memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Japan’s Finance Minister, this 
alignment was assessed by ministers from both sides: 
Aichi called particular attention to the problem posed for Prime Minister 
Tanaka by the Middle East conflict and the developing oil crisis. He 
explained quite frankly that because of the great reliance of Japan on oil 
imports from the Middle East, a number of voices are calling for Japan to 
exercise a “free hand” by undertaking a diplomatic move in favor of the 
Arabs.167 
In this meeting with Japanese leaders, Kissinger tried to convince the finance 
minister that intervening in this conflict on the side of the Arabs could be risky for Japan. 
He argued that Japan, European countries and the U.S. were being blackmailed by the 
OPEC countries.168 Japanese officers were speaking cautiously, because oil consumption 
in Japan increased rapidly during the 1960s as a result of economic growth and decline in 
the real price of oil.169 By 1965, Japan became the largest individual importer of oil. 
Therefore, the Japanese Finance Minister did not want to accept an anti-Arab strategy 
after the crisis. At this point, Kissinger continued his arguments about the problem: 
 …However, we might resolve the long-term problem, the immediate 
problem is what action would be effective for Japan to go it alone, or to 
cooperate with the United States? That is a matter of judgment. I recognize 
frankly that the temptation might be great to act alone and take a dramatic pro-
Arab position, but once that process starts what could Japan do that would be 
more dramatic if after three months it still got no oil? ... What the Arabs really 
want is a peaceful settlement, and only the U.S. can get them a peaceful 
settlement. Japan can’t, the European countries can’t, only we can.170  
 
In Kissinger’s judgments, Japan and other Western nations would lose more if 
they choose to follow their own policies. Besides, he argued that the U.S. was not 
                                                 
167 U.S. Department of State Declassified Documents Archieve, Implications of Oil Crisis for Japan's 
Domestic and International Economic Policies (Washington: U.S. Department of State-01829,[1973]).                                                           
168 Ibid.  
169 Pfaltzgraff, Energy Issues and Alliance Relationships: The United States, Western Europe and 
Japan, 17.                                                  
170 U.S. Department of State Declassified Documents Achieve, Implications of Oil Crisis for Japan's 
Domestic and International Economic Policies, 3.                                                  
 40 
vulnerable to this kind of pressure; Japan and European countries were.171 However, 
contrary to Kissinger’s judgments, U.S. economy would suffer severely from this crisis 
and it also led to the realignment of strategic alliances regarding the region. Although the 
U.S. was a large exporter of fossil fuels, both coal and oil before the 1950s; by the early 
1970s, declining U.S. domestic oil production, together with increasing demand, pushed 
importation of Arab oil to more than one million barrels per day.172 Thus, suffering from 
this oil shock was inevitable.  
In Western Europe, imports of crude oil from the area of the Middle East rose 
accordingly in order to satisfy Western Europe’s total energy consumption from 13.4% in 
1956, to 36% in 1967, and to 45% in 1973.173 Before the oil crisis, the dominant players 
of the European oil market were multinational oil companies, known as the Seven Sisters. 
The Seven Sisters consisted of Exxon, Mobil (Standard Oil of New York), Chevron 
(Standard Oil of California), the Mellon’s Gulf Oil, Shell, Texaco and British Petroleum 
(Anglo-Iranian). These companies controlled the majority of crude-oil exports to world 
markets by controlling every important pipeline in the world, such as the 753-mile Trans-
Arabian Pipeline from Qaisuma in Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean Sea, which was co-
owned by Exxon, Chevron, Texaco, and Mobil.174 After the 1950s, nationalization in the 
Middle East altered the situation in the oil market. Western European countries sought to 
reestablish their relations with Arab countries. De Gaulle of France, for instance, wanted 
to establish a role in the Arab world to strengthen France’s international position and 
limit the Anglo-Saxon energy powers’ influence on France.175 The growth of national 
Arab oil companies and independent oil companies of the West made an important 
impact on the global oil market and reduced the influence of the Seven Sisters. In 
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addition, OPEC increased its power ,due to the accession of eight new Members by 
1973.176 Thus, Western Europe became increasingly dependent on Middle Eastern oil.  
After the oil shock, the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan suffered several major 
policy issues and problems. Assuring stability of supply after the OPEC production 
cutbacks, coping with sharply increased oil prices, and dealing with national concerns 
became major problems for those states.177 Its macroeconomic consequences influenced 
both global and local economies By January 1974, world oil prices were four times 
higher than they were at the start of the crisis.  
 
Figure 3.  Crude Oil Prices after the 1973 Crisis178 
This radical increase in oil prices triggered a recession in the U.S. economy. The 
growth rate decreased and the crisis left persistent economic effects both on the global 
and the U.S. economy.  
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Figure 4.  Effects of the crisis over GDP in the U.S.179 
The effect of the oil shock on the U.S. economy was immediate and unexpected. 
The oil prices quadrupled and economic problems left inflationary and deflationary 
impacts on domestic economy. After this oil shock, the U.S. understood that Middle 
Eastern oil mattered in the macro economy. Most of the recessions since 1972 were 
preceded by political events in the Middle East, resulting in a subsequent increase in the 
price of oil, which in turn caused a recession.180 After the oil shock, economists 
concluded that oil shocks had a major effect on movements in output, consumption, 
investment, and employment in the U.S. economy. Luis Aguiar argues that non-oil 
shocks have been mainly responsible for all of the business cycles in the United States 
from 1950 to 1973; starting from 1974, however, non-oil shocks were no longer able to 
explain the movement in output, consumption, investment, and employment.181 
There are many reasons that OPEC caused such a dramatic economic effect on the 
U.S. economy. David L. Greene argues that the U.S. economy suffered three kinds of 
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economic costs as a result of its oil dependence and the actions of the OPEC cartel: 1) 
transfer of wealth, 2) loss of potential to produce and, 3) disruption losses.182  The 
transfer of wealth was from oil-importing countries to oil-producing countries. The loss 
of potential to produce and disruption losses caused potential GDP losses in the U.S. 
economy. As a result, reallocations of labor and capital were observed throughout the 
U.S. economy in response to the oil-price shocks.183 
The October 1973 crisis resulted in a divergence between European and U.S.  
policy. The crisis demonstrated the unwillingness and inability of the Europeans to work 
together to assure the supplies of energy.184  Within the European Community, there 
were different approaches to the U.S. policy and the crisis. In general, however, the 
Western Europeans looked with disdain upon U.S. policies in the Middle East. The 
problems of the oil-importing countries stemmed from the curtailment of supplies 
through the embargo (such as in the Netherlands, Portugal, and the U.S.). Because of this, 
Western European countries had different reactions to the oil shock, depending on their 
levels of Arab-oil dependence. Some of these European countries turned to alternative 
sources of indigenous energy, mainly for national use. France, for instance, turned to 
nuclear power for electricity production and the Netherlands looked towards imported 
coal.185 The Europeans generally favored bilateral agreements to find immediate 
solutions both to short-term and long-term problems of the oil supply and oil price.186 
During this period, Turkey’s foreign policy was more pro-American. However, Ankara 
supported the Palestinians and Arabs in the war of 1967 and 1973.187 In the 1973 War, 
Turkey announced that Incirlik Base (an American air base located near Adana/Turkey) 
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could not be used by the U.S. for the military supply of Israel while it allowed the Soviets 
to overfly its territory in order to supply the Arabs.188  Turkey did not want to face a 
shortage of oil; on the other hand, it wanted to maintain its Western relations. During the 
initial phases of the Arab–Israeli conflict, Turkey tried to stay neutral. Turkey’s 
recognition of Israel in 1949 and its pro-Western policies during the Suez Crisis affected 
its relations with some Arab states, such as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.  
After the 12 March 1971 military interlude, the new government of Turkey sought 
to maintain good relations with the Arab countries. Because of the worsening relations 
with the West after the Cyprus Peace Operation and the need for overcoming the energy 
shortage after the oil shock of 1973, Turkey tried to develop relations with the Middle 
East countries. An example of this change in relations was seen in the shift of migrant-
labor destinations. When the 1973 oil crisis caused an economic downturn in Western 
Europe that led to a decline in Europe’s intake of migrant labor, oil-rich Arabian 
countries became destinations for Turkish workers who were looking for opportunities 
abroad. From 1967 to 1980, there was an increasing influx of Turkish migrants into Libya 
and Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Yemen, and Jordan.189  Another reward of developing 
relations with the Arab states was Turkey’s relative exemption from the oil embargo 
announced by OPEC members. On August 1973, an agreement was signed between 
Turkey and Iraq to construct a pipeline from the Kirkuk oil field to a terminal located in 
Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Yumurtalik.190 This pipeline supplied two-thirds of 
Turkey’s oil requirements and provided an income from the flow of oil. Another positive 
result of the developing relations was seen during the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation of 
Turkey. As a result of good relations between Turkey and Libya, the Libyan leader 
Muammar Kaddafi supplied fuel and tires for Turkish combat jets engaged in the 
operation.191 Until the oil crisis of 1973, seeking alternative energy was not a matter of 
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foreign policy for Turkey. Turkey’s increased dependence on Middle Eastern oil and 
changing strategic concerns caused a shift in Turkey’s foreign policy from passive 
neutrality to a more active policy in the Middle East. 
In short, the global effects of the 1973 Crisis were more devastating and strategic 
than its regional effects. The energy crisis after the war has been one of the most 
influential and complicated issues that has shaped the strategic alignments in the region 
in particular, and globally in general. The surprise move by the oil producing countries 
changed the dynamics of the global order after their realignments for an Eastern 
Mediterranean crisis. 
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C.  THE CYPRUS DISPUTE 
This section will give brief background information about the Cyprus dispute and 
analyze the dispute from the strategic-alignments perspective after World War II. While 
mentioning historical facts of the dispute, this section will not generally emphasize the 
historic, intercommunal conflicts on the island and their domestic effects on neighboring 
countries. It will present historical analysis about the strategic importance of this Eastern 
Mediterranean island in terms of dynamic alliances and great-power games. 
1. Historical Context 
The history of the struggle over Cyprus dates back to ancient times; however, the 
conflict in modern times started after the Ottoman Empire conquered the island in 1571. 
Because of its strategic position on the main routes between Europe, Asia, and Africa, 
Cyprus has long been the focus of political conflict and cultural interaction.192 After the 
Ottoman conquest of the island, the administrative system was changed from feudalism 
and serfdom to a millet193 system. Thanks to its effective administrative system, the 
Ottoman era in Cyprus was fairly uneventful regarding minorities and citizens. However, 
a great power struggle for Cyprus continued, and external powers always tried to 
intervene in Cyprus. In 1605 the Duke of Savoy, in 1765 pro-Russian Dragomans, and in 
1804 Napoleonic France intervened in Cyprus according to their ambitions.194 In the 19th 
century, the Ottoman Empire was crumbling and tsarist Russia was an important threat 
against its sovereignty. In the last quarter of the 19th century, tsarist armies were at the 
gates of Istanbul, and Britain was worried about this threat regarding its colonial 
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interests. Britain did not want the strengthening of Russia, and wanted to support the 
Ottoman Empire during the Russo-Ottoman War. There was secret diplomacy between 
the Ottoman Empire and Britain. Britain wanted the Ottoman Empire to rent them Cyprus 
in exchange for their military support against the Russians. As a result, Cyprus was under 
British administration and there was a shift in alliances regarding this strategic Eastern 
Mediterranean island. This is known to historians as the “Eastern Question.” 
After the Eastern Question begin, with the start of nationalization and Russian 
intervention in the European part of the Ottoman Empire (the Balkans), the Christians of 
Cyprus mounted serious pressures to unite with Greece, which had just gained 
independence from the empire. Britain had difficulty resisting these ideological pressures. 
After the Balkan Wars, Crete came under Greek administration, and the pressures of the 
Christians for unification re-started at the beginning of the 19th century. 
For Britain, Cyprus was both a strategic land for its colonial interests and a 
valuable asset for bargaining with other powers during World War I. When the Ottoman 
Empire sided with Germany during the war, Britain annexed the island and offered it to 
Greece, if Greece joined the war with her. However, after Greece was dragged into the 
war, the offer was withdrawn. Britain did not want to lose control over Cyprus. The 
pressures for the union with Greece increased again after the war, and finally manifested 
in violence after 1931.195 On October 1931, riots erupted in Cyprus and the ensuing 
events culminated in the burning down of the house of the British governor in Nicosia.196 
After this time, Cyprus became an area of tension, friction, and violence between local 
ethnic groups. Besides, Cyprus became a superpower game arena for the U.S., Soviet 
Union, and Britain, because of its strategic importance.  
In addition to ethnic problems, Cyprus was an important alliance factor among the 
powers in the region, and affected the aligning of alliances. The Cyprus conflict was not 
only an intergroup conflict, but an international conflict. For Britain, after World War II, 
                                                 
195 Ibid.  
196 Bestami Sadi Bilgic, "The Cyprus Crisis of October 1931 and Greece's Reaction: The Place of 
Turkey and Turkish Cypriots in the Eyes of Greek and Greek Cypriot Leadership," USAK Yearbook of 
International Politics and Law 1 (2008), 91.                      
 48 
it was a key headquarters for their colonial empire. In a briefing note in 1950, British 
military chiefs of staff mentioned the importance of Cyprus: 
If Britain wants to keep its position in the Middle East, Cyprus must 
remain British; moreover, even in peacetime the popular communist 
movement on the island must never be allowed to win control. It is the 
only way to ensure the future of Britain’s military facilities there, and any 
weakening of this commitment will alarm Britain’s key allies, since 
Cyprus is a vital link in the chain of British bases running through the 
Mediterranean to the Middle East and beyond. The effect on Turkey and 
other Middle East countries, and indeed the United States, of any 
abrogation of British sovereignty is likely to be so serious that it is 
strategically necessary for Cyprus to remain British,197 
In Britain, there were high-level calls for unifying Cyprus and Greece. The reason 
was that unifying Greece and Cyprus would strengthen the  Greek government’s position 
in its struggle against the Communist-influenced opposition.198 However, when the 
Greek civil war ended with the defeat of the Communists, Britain still did not take action 
for unification. As argued above, Cyprus was a key bargaining asset for great powers, 
and they never wanted to give it up easily. Similarly, in the future, this island, a new 
member of the EU, also would be used as a bargaining chip in determining the course of 
Turkey’s accession process to the EU.  
Even though the British Empire wanted to keep its strategic island base, the third 
quarter of the 20th century brought many difficulties to this colonial power. Regarding 
Cyprus, the first serious Greek Cypriot anti-colonial resistance started during the 1950s 
and they wanted to achieve their historic goal, unification with Greece or “Enosis.” 
Besides, anti-colonial movements and decolonization were shaking the region during the 
1950s. For Britain, this period was a radical decline of their historic colonial era. Britain 
passed the torch of leadership in the Middle East and other regions to the U.S.199 The 
U.S. exerted pressure on Britain, Greece, and Turkey to seek solutions for the problem, 
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which was harming NATO’s main objectives. These reasons forced Britain to deal with 
the Cyprus problem seriously. However, the British never thought of giving up its certain 
influence and privileges in the region, such as military bases on the island.  
During the late 1950s, the Cyprus problem became a main issue for the prime 
ministers of three countries: Adnan Menderes of Turkey, Harold MacMillan of Britain 
and Constantine Karamanlis of Greece. After the creation of the violent group EOKA 
(the National Organization of Cyprus Fighters) and their ideology of Enosis (call for a 
union with Greece), the violence against Turkish-origin Cypriots increased dramatically. 
While GCs wanted enosis, and some of them appealed violence for this goal, TCs did not 
want enosis and supported the idea of taksim, partition of the island, because of the 
violence coming from Greek Cypriot EOKA organization. It is generally believed that the 
problem was a dispute among Greece, Turkey, Great Britain, and Cyprus itself. However, 
the developments on the island in October 1931, and their reflections in Greece, revealed 
that in the eyes of the Greek elite and public opinion, the Cyprus dispute was a matter 
between Greece, GCs, and Britain.200 Being ignored was the reason why the Turkish 
Cypriots, who had lived peacefully with the GCs under the Ottoman rule for centuries, 
wanted partition of the island. 
The tensions between Turkey and Greece would not contribute anything to the 
long-term Cold War goals of the U.S. The U.S. feared a serious conflict between Turkey 
and Greece, as it would only serve to benefit the Soviet Union by weakening NATO.  
On 16 August 1960, after the Zurich and London Agreements between the United 
Kingdom, Turkey, and Greece, the independent Cyprus Republic was founded. These 
agreements gave the three mother-states guarantor rights over the island. The 
compromise agreement was that Britain, Greece, and Turkey would jointly guarantee an 
independent Cyprus. The president would be Greek Cypriot and the vice-president a 
Turkish Cypriot, with separate communal assemblies, but a joint national assembly, while 
950 Greek and 650 Turkish troops would be stationed on the island. Britain would retain 
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two military bases.201 The Greek government never wished to see Turkey involved in the 
dispute. The British ambassador to Greece had written,  
The Greeks are angry at the UK plan to involve the Turks […] on the 
grounds that it introduced an element of Turkish governmental 
intervention […] and since it must lead to further antagonism and 
eventually to partition.202 
After the foundation of the Cyprus Republic, the interference of the Soviet Union 
increased, which was something the U.S. never wanted. The pro-Soviet Makarios, the 
new president of Cyprus, visited the pro-Soviet leader Nasser of Egypt and attended a 
conference of the non-aligned nations in Belgrade. Because of his government policies 
and proposal of “thirteen points” to break out the policies of London–Zurich Accords, 
most TCs in public office, including Vice-President Küçük, resigned. Turkish Cypriots 
moved out of ethnically mixed areas into villages and towns where the population was 
already largely Turkish Cypriot.   
In 1963, violence between two groups increased again, and a serious reaction to 
the violence came from Britain. Leaders of all parties met in London and declared their 
thoughts about the dispute. It was a deadlock, because GCs wanted a completely 
independent state in which the Greeks would rule and the TCs would be safeguarded as a 
minority. From the Turkish Cypriot’s view, the violence after the 1931 and the nationalist 
ideology of enosis left no room for them to live under the safeguarding of the GCs. Thus, 
they supported partition of the island and self-administration by their own people.  
2. Great Power Perceptions and Interventions 
The Cold War strategies of the great powers dominated the Cyprus problem for 
many years. Britain was one of the major players in the Cyprus game. For Britain, Cyprus 
was at the heart of the strategic defense of its Middle Eastern concerns, and the oil was 
the most important among these concerns. The production of crude oil in the Middle East 
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increased from six million tons in 1938 to 163 million tons by 1955.203 Other two 
important oil producers, the U.S. and Venezuela, were consuming their production in the 
Americas, and not exporting it. The Soviet Union was also producing its own oil, but 
exportable surplus was very little. Thus, Europe relied heavily on Middle Eastern oil 
supplies for its economic recovery. The region supplied two-thirds of Britain’s needs and 
contained 65 percent of the world’s known reserves, which implied that Western 
economies would come to rely on it still further as they expanded in the future. The oil 
was produced mainly in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran. The oil was carried by 
pipeline (41 million tons a year by 1956) or by ship via the Suez Canal (77 million tons a 
year) and through the Mediterranean to Europe. 204 The production, transportation, and 
sale of Middle Eastern oil were important for Britain’s economy and stability. 
Consequently, British assets in the region should have been safeguarded and the lines of 
communication should have been protected.  
Before the 1950s, Britain’s overseas defense center for its Middle East concerns 
was the Suez. During this period, the military headquarters in Suez maintained up to 
80,000 reserve troops that could rapidly redeployed and reinforce British garrisons in the 
Levant and Persian Gulf.205 After the Suez Crisis, Britain couldn’t have maintained such 
a force in the Suez. As a result, Cyprus remained the only alternative for Britain to create 
and reserve an overseas defense base. In short, energy security and control of trade were 
the main concern for Britain regarding Cyprus. 
The second important factor for both Britain and the U.S. was the threat of Soviet 
expansion. After World War II, pro-Soviet regimes were established all around the world. 
The British and Americans feared that the Soviet threat would next extend to southern 
Europe, and Greece, which dealt with a civil war between Communist forces backed by 
pro-Soviet powers and nationalist forces backed by Britain and the U.S.206 Turkey, which 
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was controlling the strategic waterways of the Istanbul Strait and Canakkale Strait (the 
only sea passages between the Soviet Union and the Mediterranean) was also a target of 
the Soviets. Therefore, Cyprus was a vital strategic base to keep the Soviets out of the 
Middle East. For Turkey, Cyprus was important for two vital reasons. On one hand, there 
were TCs who were suffering from ethnic violence and awaiting help from their 
“motherland;” on the other hand, Cyprus had a strategic importance from being located 
just seventy miles to the south of Turkey’s “soft underbelly” in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.207 For free access to the Mediterranean and the Middle East from the 
southern ports of Turkey, Cyprus had utmost importance. During this period, Turkey was 
surrounded by potential hostile neighbors such as Greece and Soviet Russia. If Cyprus 
became part of Greece as a result of the nationalist and violent ideology of enosis, Turkey 
would have been completely surrounded by potential enemies.208 As a result of these 
concerns, Turkey started to intervene in Cyprus after the 1950s.  
In 1963, when violence intensified in Cyprus, Prime Minister Inonu met with 
army officers and diplomats to assess the situation. Inonu ordered jets to fly over the 
island as a warning and to launch bombs if violence continued.209 After a short time, 
Turkish jets were flying over the island, and the Turkish fleet was proceeding from 
Istanbul to Mersin. This was a warning from Turkey to Britain, Greece, the U.S., and also 
NATO. Turkey’s message was that if these groups did not take an action against the 
violence in the island, Turkey would intervene unilaterally. Finally, Turkey, Greece, and 
the TCs agreed to a NATO force of 10,000 men, under the command of a British officer 
stationed in Cyprus, for the security of both sides. On the other hand, the U.S. secretary 
of state could not convince the Greek Cypriot leader Makarios about this force. Makarios, 
who seemed to be trying to follow a non-aligned course, wanted a solution with the UN. 
This meant that Soviet Union could have intervened in the dispute and make its weight 
felt in this power game.210 
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In March 1964 after the UN Security Council’s preparations of many draft 
resolutions about the dispute, a UN peace force was established with the approval of the 
government of Cyprus. However, the UN forces could not bring the violence to an end. 
On April 1964, Prime Minister Inonu gave an interview to Time magazine: 
While Turkey had done its best to preserve its alliance with the West, its 
allies had been competing with the enemies in destroying the Western 
alliance.[…] If our allies do not change their attitude, the Western alliance 
will break up, and then a new kind of world order will be established 
under new conditions, and in this world Turkey will find itself a place. I 
had faith in the leadership of America, which has responsibility within the 
Western alliance, I am suffering now as a result of this attitude.211  
This interview was a message to the world that Turkish intervention against the 
violence in the Island could be expected according to Turkey’s legal rights as a guarantor 
state of the 1960 agreement. After a month, U.S. president Johnson sent a warning letter 
to Turkish Prime Minister Inonu: 
I am gravely concerned by the information that the Turkish Government is 
contemplating a decision to intervene by military force to occupy a portion 
of Cyprus. I wish to emphasize, in the fullest friendship and frankness, 
that I do not consider that such a course of action by Turkey, fraught with 
such far reaching consequences, is consistent with the commitment of 
your government to consult fully in advance with the United States. […]It 
is my impression that you believe that such intervention by Turkey is 
permissible under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. I 
must call your attention, however, to our understanding that the proposed 
intervention by Turkey would be for the purpose of supporting an attempt 
by Turkish Cypriot leaders to partition the island, a solution which is 
specifically excluded by the Treaty of Guarantee. […]Turkish intervention 
in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between Turkish and 
Greek forces.  Adhesion to NATO, in its very essence, means that NATO 
countries will not wage war on each other. Germany and France have 
buried centuries of animosity and hostility in becoming NATO allies; 
nothing less can be expected from Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, a 
military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to direct involvement 
by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies 
have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to 
protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which 
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results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of 
its NATO allies.212  
This letter was a summary of the U.S. strategy and Cold War power game over 
Cyprus. Johnson’s letter, even though it was not openly mentioned in Turkey so as not to 
negatively affect public opinion, forced Turkish leadership to question the basic 
assumptions on which Turkey’s foreign policy rested.213 Despite its tough tone, Turkish–
American relations continued normally and Turkey decided not to intervene in Cyprus, 
thinking that the U.S. initiative would present a solution to the problem. Besides, this 
letter forced Turkey to realize that the interests of Turkey and the West could sometimes 
clash with each other, and Turkey should have sometimes thought individually for its 
national causes. 
The Soviet Union was interested in the Cyprus dispute from the foundation of the 
Cyprus Republic in 1960. With its non-alignment policy, under the leadership of 
Makarios, Cyprus allowed the communist party AKEL and maintained good relations 
with pro-Soviet countries. For instance, in September 1969, when the U.S. was trying to 
force North Vietnam to the negotiating table to settle the war, it urged friendly nations to 
apply pressure on the North Vietnam government. However, the U.S. discovered that 
Cyprus, under the leadership of Makarios, was one of four non-communist countries still 
shipping to North Vietnam.214 When Makarios refused to cut the trading link, Nixon cut 
off American aid to Cyprus.  
The USSR’s policy in Cyprus had two major effects after 1960s: supporting 
Makarios and thereby preventing the region from coming under the full control of 
NATO; and later, supporting both Turkey and Greece to take advantage of the fissure in 
the southeastern front of NATO.215 Makarios did not totally follow the ideology of enosis 
or everything that the Greek government mentioned. As a result, in 1974, a coup against 
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Makarios took place under the Cypriot national guard and EOKA-B, which were led by a 
Greek junta. 
Turkey considered this a violation of treaties and guarantees, and the prime 
minister of Turkey ordered the Turkish armed forces to prepare for military intervention 
in Cyprus to protect the TCs and maintain peace. Turkey’s military intervention in 
Cyprus, the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974, was a turning point for Turkey in terms of 
foreign policy and realignment. Turkey’s relations with both the U.S. and European 
countries came to be increasingly affected by the Cyprus question.216 The new de facto 
partition and unilateral declaration of the independence of TRNC was the beginning of a 
new era for the Cyprus question, and Cyprus would again be on the agenda of 
international powers in the future.  
In short, rather than being an inter-communal dispute, the Cyprus Dispute has 
been one of the most influential and complicated issues that has shaped strategic 
alignments in the Eastern Mediterranean among Turkey, Greece, the U.S., Britain, the 
Soviet Union, and strategic organizations such as NATO and the UN. Today, the great-
power game of the Cold War has changed, and the USSR has left the U.S. as the only 
superpower in the world. However, with the liquidation of the Soviet threat and European 
unification, a “United States of Europe” has emerged as a major actor on the global 
stage.217 It is obvious that this major actor would want to take part in the new era of 
globalization and show itself in one of the most strategic points of the world, the Eastern 
Mediterranean, by enlarging its borders in this region. In addition, because of new 
offshore hydrocarbon resources and new geostrategic energy routes in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, European energy security would be under the tight controls of whichever 
entity emerged as most powerful in the region. 
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IV. CURRENT SITUATION IN THE EASTERN 
MEDITERRANEAN AND TURKEY’S EMERGING ROLE 
A. TURKEY AS AN ENERGY HUB  
Geographically, Turkey is in the middle of the energy consumer and producer 
countries. It is located in close proximity to more than 70% of the world’s proven oil and 
gas reserves.218 Turkey is becoming an important energy hub in the region and standing 
as a key country in ensuring energy security through diversification of supply sources and 
routes. Turkey is now becoming a major transportation center for the consumption of 
Iranian gas and oil, as well as for its transport to the West, despite strong opposition of 
the U.S.219 Additionally, Turkey`s relations with Caucasian countries as a bridge for their 
energy resources transported to the West via Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline ending in 
the Eastern Mediterranean, seems an independent strategic act not in keeping with 
Turkey’s Cold War policies as a buffer state. Graham Fuller suggests that Russia now 
views Turkey as an independent competitor to Moscow and no longer an instrument of 
the U.S. policies.220 
Similarly, the EU considers Turkey as a reliable partner in the oil and gas industry 
and as a strategic link for the transportation of gas from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea 
to Europe.221 Historically, Turkey has been affected by the ‘energy weapon’ both as 
consumer and as an East-West transit node for regional energy flows. 222 For this reason, 
it seeks to diversify its energy supply sources and routes. Nabucco Pipeline, for instance, 
is considered as an alternative to Russia’s energy dominance in Europe. Similarly, 
Turkey has energy agreements with Russia, Iran, Iraq, Qatar and Syria in order to 
                                                 
218 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Turkey's Energy Strategy," 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_nin-enerji-stratejisi.tr.mfa (accessed November/11, 2012).                                   
219 Graham Fuller, The New Turkish Republic (Washington D.C.: The United States Institute of 
Peace, 2008), 112.                                   
220 Ibid.  
221 Eric Watkins, "Turkey Overplays its Hand," Oil & Gas Journal, Sep 26, 2011, 2011, , 2.                                     
222 Fuller, The New Turkish Republic, 84.                                      
 58 
diversify its energy supply and create interdependence for its energy needs.223 Current 
Turkish energy policy suggests that major pipeline projects, realized and proposed, which 
will contribute to Europe’s energy  security, will also enhance Turkey’s role as a reliable 
transit country on the East-West and North-South energy axis.224 From different energy 
source regions, such as the  Greater Caspian and the Middle East, to the West; Turkey 
wants to establish a reliable flow of hydrocarbons east-west and north-south through 
pipelines such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline (BTC), the Kirkuk-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline, 
the South Caucasus Pipeline, the Turkey-Greece-Italy Gas Pipeline, the Nabucco Gas 
Pipeline, the Trans-Caspian Pipeline, the Kazakh-oil expansion to BTC, the Iraqi Gas and 
North-South of Blue Stream Gas Pipeline, the Samsun-Ceyhan Bypass Oil Pipeline, the 
Burgas-Alexandropulos Oil Pipeline-Bypass for straits, the Samsun-Ceyhan Pipeline and 
Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP).225    
 
Figure 5.  Natural Gas Pipeline Projects of Turkey226 
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For Europe, BTC pipeline is a vital alternative energy transportation route. The 
BTC pipeline project was completed in 2006 and oil is currently being pumped from the 
Baku oil fields to Ceyhan port of the Eastern Mediterranean and finally Europe.227 
Similarly, natural gas transportation projects have been agreed for transferring natural gas 
to Europe from Central Asian and Middle Eastern gas fields. Some of these regional and 
interregional projects are the Iran to Europe pipeline, the Turkmenistan to Europe 
pipeline, the Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey and Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan-Iran (or Armenia)-
Turkey gas pipelines.228  
In short, it is obvious that Turkey has become one of the world’s largest energy 
hubs, and a key country ensuring the energy security in the region. The Turkish Foreign 
Minister Davutloglu commented on this importance in a journal article: 
Turkey is patiently waiting for the EU to appreciate its indispensable 
position with regard to energy security, cultural politics and transit routes. 
When they acknowledge Turkey’s value in these terms, they will realize 
that Europe’s global power can only be attained through Turkey’s full 
integration into Europe. Turkey shares common interests with Russia, 
Iran, and the United States for the successful operation of natural gas and 
oil pipelines that run in various directions through the Turkish territory. 
Hence, Turkish analysts try to combine all these interests in one single 
picture. This is a rational calculation, not an ideological account.229 
 
B. ENERGY SECURITY AND THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN 
1. Militarization of Energy and Maritime Security 
As Daniel Moran and James Russell argue, today, energy security is taken with 
the national security, and in a new world that suppressed and constrained territorial 
disputes, ideological competition, ethnic irredentism and even nuclear confrontation, 
actual use of military forces are limited.230 Thus, conflicts and sovereignty right claims 
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over global energy supplies stand as one of the most important casus belli which enables 
the military forces to be used actively. Since World War II, there have been important 
military confrontations for controlling energy assets, strategic points or energy 
transportation instruments. Even if there was not a military conflict among the powers, 
their energy markets have been protected indirectly by their military powers, such as 
Britain and the U.S. to maintain free transit of goods across the high seas.231 In that 
respect, the Eastern Mediterranean has encountered direct and indirect militarization of 
energy by many countries and strategic organizations (such as NATO and the UN) after 
the World War II. 
Today, legitimacy and justification of such a militarization has vital importance. 
On the one hand, militarization of the energy should be legitimized and justified in 
domestic politics and the legal bases of the related country; on the other hand it must be 
legitimized and approved by international partners and organizations. These kinds of 
militarization of energy can be seen even in seemingly peaceful and democratic 
organizations, such as the European Union. 
2012 Nobel Peace Prize recipient the European Union, an alternative global 
power committed to the pursuit of an international order based on good governance, 
democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights, has engaged militarily on 
many occasions to manage conflicts in which natural resources have played a key role.232 
Within the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP, then called 
ESDP), the EU has launched civilian and military crisis management operations in other 
countries where natural resources are closely linked to conflicts, such as Moldova and 
Ukraine in 2005 (EUBAM), Iraq in 2005 (EUJUST LEX), Georgia in 2008 (EUMM) and 
Libya in 2011 (EUFOR).233 
Similarly, the U.S., Russia, Turkey and many other countries and organizations 
engaged in militarily in many energy and maritime security related issues. Under 
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NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor, for instance, NATO ships are patrolling the 
Mediterranean and monitoring shipping to help detect, deter and protect the maritime 
trade against terrorist activity.234 Russia, as in its old Soviet days, has many times wanted 
to show its naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. In August 2012, for instance, a 
Russian joint naval task force on a training mission in the Mediterranean conducted two-
day tactical exercises with live-firing drills with more than ten warships.235. Turkey, 
which has the longest coast in the Eastern Mediterranean and has vital strategic concerns 
in the region, also initiated many naval operations both individually and collectively. 
According to the official mission of the Turkish Navy, these were designed to defend the 
homeland against probable maritime threats and consider country’s related interests. 
Located in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Gulf of İskenderun, terminal area for the 
pipelines of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Kerkuk-Yumurtalık, has annually 140 million tons 
of oil capacity which is an outstanding proportion regarding energy security. Because of 
this reason, the “Mediterranean Shield Operation” was initiated by the Turkish Naval 
Forces on 1 April 2006, in order to deter, disrupt and suppress terrorism, of weapons of 
mass destruction and other illegal acts.236 Similarly, Turkish, Italian and German naval 
ships, comprising the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2), have been 
participating in maritime exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean.237  
The boundaries of the West have moved eastward and southward. Thus, the 
Eastern Mediterranean became the outer limit of the West. With the membership of the 
GCs, the EU extended its borders to this region. With many collective operations and 
cooperation initiatives, such as the Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative or Operation Active 
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Endeavour, NATO shows its military presence in the region. After the 2006 Lebanon-
Israeli Crisis, the UN Security Council deployed the United Nations Interim Force in 
Lebanon (UNIFIL) military forces to assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its 
effective authority in the area. The Russian naval presence in Tartus port Syria and 
Britain’s BFC (British Forces Cyprus) Military Base have long been active in the region. 
Ignoring some humanitarian reasons, military activity in the Eastern 
Mediterranean is one of the best examples of militarization of energy and maritime 
security. Even though a new world order has been established after the Cold War, the 
picture we see today resembles the Cold War’s great power game in the region   
C. DELIMITATION OF MARITIME AREAS AND PROBABLE CRISIS IN 
THE REGION 
The Eastern Mediterranean region, which today attracts international interest in 
hydrocarbon transportation, exploration and production, has been one of the world`s most 
strategic regions. It has been the center of many energy and maritime related crisis in 
history. Today, as a continuation and a result of old disputes, delimitation of maritime 
areas has become a major dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
The Cyprus question has long been an obstacle for the region’s stability and 
security. In the 2004 expansion plan of the European Union (EU) (the fifth expansion), 
after which the EU expanded from 15 to 25 member state, Greek Cypriot Administration 
became a member of the EU. Even though the Cyprus Island was divided, and the UN 
referendum in 2004 for the reunification of the island was rejected by the GCs, the EU 
paradoxically accepted the membership of the island as ‘United Cyprus Republic’, 
claiming that TRNC spell out words is void, and problematically confirmed that the 
Greek part of the Island represents the entire Island. 238 The Cyprus question has long 
been an obstacle for the region’s stability and security. In the 2004 expansion plan of the 
European Union (EU) (the fifth expansion), after which the EU expanded from 15 to 25 
member state, Greek Cypriot Administration became a member of the EU. Even though 
the Cyprus Island was divided, and the UN referendum in 2004 for the reunification of 
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the island was rejected by the GCs, the EU paradoxically accepted the membership of the 
island as ‘United Cyprus Republic’, claiming that TRNC spell out words is void, and 
problematically confirmed that the Greek part of the Island represents the entire 
Island. 239  
Beside the Cyprus question, there are also other problematic issues such as few 
and disputed ‘delimitation of maritime areas’ agreements, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
and the Arab Spring, regarding the region. The Eastern Mediterranean is a semi-enclosed 
sea consisting of multiple littoral states. Thus, achieving a maritime delimitation is a 
complex issue which should be on the basis of international law and should not infringe 
upon third parties’ rights.240  
In the last few years, potential offshore natural gas fields have been discovered in 
the Eastern Mediterranean basin. Energy companies argue that there are huge oil and gas 
reserves in the little-explored Mediterranean Sea between Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Israel, 
Syria and Lebanon. A U.S. energy company, Noble Energy, noted that the natural gas 
discovery in the Eastern Mediterranean Block-12 has estimated gross mean resources of 7 
trillion cubic feet (Tcf), and   Leviathan 17 Tcf of gross natural gas mean resources, 
representing the largest deep-water natural gas discovery in the world over the past 
decade.241 As a result, the region has been attracting the global energy companies’ 
interests today.  
Although many disputed issues remain to be solved, the GCAC, which does not 
represent in law or in fact TCs and Cyprus as a whole, has been pursuing an adventurous 
policy in the Eastern Mediterranean through concluding maritime delimitation 
agreements and conducting oil/gas exploration and issuing permits for such activities 
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around the island.242 Israel and GCAC signed an EEZ243 agreement in 17 December 
2010, and announced this agreement to the UN in 12 July 2011.244  
Turkey argues that this provocative policy compromises and prejudges the TCs’ 
existing equal rights over the natural resources of the island and the sea areas of the 
Island of Cyprus.245 Besides, Turkey suggests that this issue should be a part of the 
comprehensive settlement in Cyprus, and Turkish and GCs should benefit equally from 
the island’s natural resources. 
After the deterioration of the relations between Israel and Turkey because of the 
Gaza Blockade and the Flotilla Crisis, Israel has alternative allies in the Mediterranean 
region, courting Greece and Greek Cypriot Administration.246 Paradoxically, GCs and 
Greece outwardly supported Palestinians in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. Today, three 
non-Muslim community of the Eastern Mediterranean (Israel, Greece and GCAC) are re-
aligning their relations because of energy issues.  
For the legal rights of the TCs, Turkey and TRNC signed a Continental Shelf 
(CS)247 agreement on 21 September 2011, and a licensed survey ship (R/V Piri Reis) 
conducted 2V seismic surveys in the CS of TRNC.248 Piri Reis started research in the 
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areas some of which are overlapping with GCs blocks where GCs and other oil 
companies are exploring. 
 
Figure 6. Agreed CS of TRNC and Licensed Blocks for Off-Shore Survey for TRNC, and 
GCs’ Block Overlapping with TCs’ Blocks 249 
In order to maintain a settlement, after this agreement, Turkey proposed to UN 
Secretary General and Greek Cypriot Administration that off-shore activities of both 
sides should be ceased simultaneously and both sides should jointly determine energy 
activities, including revenue sharing and the funding of a possible settlement.250 After all 
settlement endeavors of Turkey and TRNC, Greek Cypriot Administration opened an 
international bid and called energy companies for a survey of the 12 blocks of disputed 
off-shore areas. This meant that, there would be international participation in this 
disputed energy game. American Noble Energy, Russian Gazprom, French and Italian 
energy giants Total and ENI, as well as the Korean Gas company and Gazprom-
subsidiary Novatec were licensed to explore gas in the disputed blocks.251   
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Besides the problem violating the legal rights of TCs, some blocks of the Greek 




Figure 6.  GCs’ Blocks Overlapping with Turkish Continental Shelf252  and EEZ 253 
Regarding Turkey’s CS and EEZ areas to the west of longitude 32° 16’ 18”E, 
Turkey has registered to the UN for its legal rights and Turkey is protecting its rights in 
its maritime jurisdiction areas. 254  
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These problematic issues in the Eastern Mediterranean could lead a regional and 
global crisis unless certain measures are taken. To prevent future crisis in this fragile 
region, Turkey proposed to the UN that TCs and GCs should be encouraged to sit 
together to determine the future of the energy activities which could help a probable 
settlement of this historic problem.255 Otherwise, countries of the global energy 
companies (such as the U.S. and Russia), the EU (by its new Eastern Mediterranean 
member), Israel and Turkey will find themselves in a Cold War-like energy game in the 
waters of the Eastern Mediterranean. Similarly, as a proposal to the dispute of 
delimitation of maritime zones in the region, Cihat Yayci suggests that Turkey can make 
treaties on delimitation of maritime zones not only with Egypt and TRNC, but also with 
Syria, Israel and Lebanon in the light of international law.256 If a settlement is achieved, 
the biggest and safest energy hub of the region, Turkey, would be a very feasible and 
profitable gateway to the Europe that has been seeking for alternative energy sources for 
its future energy security. This could also prevent new and dangerous alignments, which 
could lead to the militarization of the energy and countries’ use of the energy weapon for 
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V. CONCLUSION 
As can be seen from the case studies, after World War II, energy and maritime 
history affairs have played particularly important parts in the alignment of regional and 
international relations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since the region lies at the axis of 
movement, both north-south and east-west, it has been at the juncture of the land and 
maritime trade, energy transportation and, naturally, great conflicts and crises. In these 
different crises involving the superpowers in the Eastern Mediterranean, sometimes they 
created quite different alignments depending on their strategic concerns.257  
The Suez Crisis, when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal and took strategic trade 
control from Britain, was a surprise energy and maritime-related crisis in which  Britain 
and the U.S. wrongly interpreted aspects of the conflict. With respect to energy and 
maritime security, the 1956 Crisis caused a radical realignment of alliances and a shift in 
balance of power. The Crisis was a turning-point in global history that resulted in the 
emergence of a new international order, in which the U.S. would be the leader.258 The 
British Empire, upon which the sun never (used to) set, devolved its imperial hegemony 
and handed over leadership in the Middle East to the U.S. In this power game, Turkey 
fulfilled her historical responsibility as a buffer state by preventing Soviet access to the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East. 
Similarly, in 1973 the Arab-Israeli War in the Eastern Mediterranean and the oil 
crisis following the war had shocking effects regarding the alliances and global economy. 
During this period, OPEC increased its power due to the accession of new members, and 
thus, the world became increasingly dependent on Middle Eastern oil. After the oil 
embargo of the OPEC, by January 1974, world oil prices were four times higher than 
they were at the start of the crisis. Suffering from the crisis, European policy started to 
diverge from the U.S. policy in the Middle East. The Arab countries’ use of energy as a 
weapon  resulted in the realignment of alliances in the region. During this period, Turkey 
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followed a more pro-Western but well-balanced foreign policy. Though a powerful U.S. 
ally, Ankara supported the Palestinians and Arabs in the war of 1967 and 1973, and 
Turkey announced that Incirlik Base (an American air base located near Adana,Turkey) 
could not be used by the U.S. to supply Israel; yet it allowed the Soviets to overfly its 
territory in order to supply Arabs.259 Turkey, on the one hand, did not want to face a 
shortage of oil; on the other hand wanted to maintain its Western relations. It is obvious 
that Turkey has been one of the few countries that has worked to maintain its relations 
with both the West and the Middle East.  
Cyprus, a strategic gate for the free access to the Mediterranean and the Middle 
East, has been at the center of these energy and maritime related crisis. Therefore, it has 
been a key land for the strategic alliances after the World War II. During the Cold War, 
energy security and control of the trade was the main concern for the U.S., the Soviet 
Union and the other parities in the Eastern Mediterranean, and Cyprus dispute was at the 
center of this power game. The USSR wanted to intervene in Cyprus to prevent the U.S.-
led NATO intervention in the dispute, and to take advantage of the fissure in the 
southeastern front of NATO. Rather than being an inter-communal dispute, the Cyprus 
Dispute has been one of the most influential and complicated issues shaping  strategic 
alignments in the Eastern Mediterranean among Turkey, Greece, the U.S., Britain, the 
Soviet Union and strategic organizations such as NATO, the UN and today the EU260. 
The great power game of the Cold War  changed after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and  set 
off in a new era in international relations that  reinforced the world economic trends 
towards  globalization.261 In this new order, Turkey’s strategic role as a buffer state 
declined. However, Turkey, located in the junction of energy resources, has now a much 
more critical role for the regional and global security with its stable position neighboring 
the most risky and unstable regions of the world. Turkey is viewed as an independent 
competitor in the global arena and no longer an instrument for the Western policies.262  
                                                 
259 Oran, Turkish Foreign Policy: 1919-2006, 420.   
260 The EU has extended its borders to the Eastern Mediterranean after the problematic membership 
of the GCASC. 
261 Ozveren, Geo-Strategic Significance of Cyprus:Long-Term Trends and Prospects, 6.    
262 Ibid.113 
 71 
The Eastern Mediterranean, which today attracts international interest in 
hydrocarbon transportation, exploration and production, is witnessing severe energy 
related problems that challenge regional security and stability. Unless settled, energy and 
maritime security related problems will threaten Turkey’s role as the most important and 
stable energy hub in the region in particular and could hinder global security and stability 
more generally. Either of these could result in a hostile realignment of alliances and 
militarization of energy as it was seen in case studies. If settled, however, the region 
could become an area of peaceful alignments that will revive the Eastern Mediterranean’s 
historic mission of being the cradle of civilization, partnership and prosperity. In this 
settlement and realignment process; Turkey, with its emerging role for contributing to the 
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